The largest NATO base in Europe is still under construction. The new base at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base 57 in Romania will permanently host up to 10,000 soldiers, and according to Romania’s Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, Sorin Grindeanu, the American military base at Mihail Kogălniceanu, in Constanța County, represents another strategic asset for transforming the Port of Constanța into a logistics hub, which will become the main logistics hub for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The base is so strategic that most of the information regarding its construction and the contractors is classified.
On February 28, 2022, France deployed the NATO Response Force’s “spearhead” battalion to Romania as part of Mission AIGLE, aimed at enhancing the Alliance’s deterrent and defensive posture against Russia. This action was a direct response to Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine and encompassed eight mandates from 2022 to 2024. Recently, France has expressed significant interest in the strategic trijunction of Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, a historically important area that NATO aims to secure to restrict Russia’s operational reach along its Southeastern flank, particularly at the vulnerable “Focșani Gate“. This region, approximately 60 km x 80 km, is situated near Focșani, Galați, and Brăila, within the Wallachian Plain between the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River.
French military cartographers have recently conducted three-dimensional mapping of the Focșani Gate area, adjacent to the borders of Moldova and Ukraine. These developments prompt critical questions, especially in light of France’s recent remarks regarding the possible deployment of French forces in Ukraine.
MAP: Focșani, Galați, and Brăila (The Focșani Gate) in proximity to Budjak, a Southern region of Odessa and Constanta, where NATO Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base 57 in Romania is located (Source: MAPY)
Interestingly, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) 2021 report analyses NATO Military Mobility Project Appendix 3 titled “Focşani Gate“, outlining the key terrain in NATO’s Southeastern Region with 2 possible supply routes, with the Port of Focșani, Romania as its final destination. Route 1 would start in Italy, and Route 2 in Germany.
VIDEO: NATO allies’ long journey to Romania in a war with RUSSIA (Source: Panorama)
.
Currently, there is no evidence that the Russian Armed Forces intend to seize the Focsani Gates. Therefore, it is plausible that Macron and the NATO military chiefs are concentrating on a plan to secure Odessa, located just under 220 kilometres from the “Focșani Gate.” This approach may include allowing troops to occupy the Budjak region in southern Odessa, extending to the Danube ports, including Izmail. The Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base 57 would therefore become a crucial asset to provide air support to any Southeastern NATO flank operation…
Andrew Korybko writes on his Substack…
France’s 3D Mapping Of Romania’s “Focsani Gate” Might Not Really Be For Defensive Purposes
The attention that France is paying to tactical details like the local terrain near the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian trijunction suggests that its talk about an intervention in Ukraine is more serious than some think.
The attention that France is paying to tactical details like the local terrain near the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian trijunction suggests that its talk about an intervention in Ukraine is more serious than some think.
Le Figaro reported in early April that French military cartographers carried out 3D mapping of Romania’s “Focsani Gate” near that country’s trijunction with Moldova and Ukraine. The pretext was ostensibly to bolster the host country’s defenses in the scenario that Russian forces in Ukraine ever approach this region and subsequently prepare to invade NATO’s southeastern flank. The current context suggests that France might have ulterior motives, however, considering its talk about intervening in Ukraine.
Updated knowledge of the “Focsani Gate” could enable French forces in Romania to swiftly advance towards the Ukrainian ports of Reni and Izmail on the Danube River if the decision is made to formally involve Paris in the conflict. Kiev officially employs those ports for exporting grain, but they’re also suspected of being entry points for Western arms, hence their dual importance. Their other significance lies on the route to Odessa, which France will likely seek to secure if it intervenes in Ukraine.
All three would therefore likely figure into France’s immediate military-strategic goals if it formally involves itself in the conflict, thus explaining the need for positioning its forces in Romania and especially 3D mapping the “Focsani Gate” for the ulterior purpose of facilitating this scenario. To be clear, France might not go through with an intervention since Russia said that it’ll target all foreign forces in Ukraine, and the US said that it won’t extend Article 5 defense guarantees to NATO countries’ troops there.
Nevertheless, it’s worth being aware of the attention that France is paying to tactical details like the local terrain near the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian trijunction, which suggests that its talk about an intervention in Ukraine is more serious than some think. With these possible motives in mind, it can be concluded that France envisages Romania but also Moldova falling within its “sphere of influence”, potentially together with the historical Budjak region of what is nowadays southwestern Ukraine.
These plans, regardless of whether or not they unfold, are part of France’s competition for leadership of post-conflict Europe that was analyzed here. The gist is that this portion of Southeastern Europe is more likely to remain within France’s “sphere of influence” than anywhere else in the continent due to its military presence in Romania and last spring’s defense pact with Moldova. Although very poor, these two fraternal countries occupy strategic locations that can elevate France’s role in post-conflict Europe.
They essentially serve as NATO’s gateway to Odessa and Transnistria, and if France establishes itself as the main foreign force there, then it can have a decisive say in any such future operations. Furthermore, France might even make its rotational military presence in Romania a permanent one along the lines of the newly opened German base in Lithuania, thus meaning that no return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, like Putin wants, would be possible without both Berlin and Paris’ agreement.
It’s premature to predict that France will do so, but such a scenario can’t be ruled out either, since it would align with Paris’s Great Power goals. After all, these new 3D maps weren’t produced just for the sake of it or as a favor to Romania, but to facilitate a French intervention in Ukraine. Even if one isn’t forthcoming, France could entrench its forces in Romania by one day opening a permanent base, which could enable it to retain this option for the future and give it military-diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis Russia.
See more analysis on Andrew Korybko’s Substack
READ MORE NATO NEWS AT: 21st Century Wire Nato Files
SUPPORT OUR INDEPENDENT MEDIA PLATFORM – BECOME A MEMBER @21WIRE.TV
VISIT OUR TELEGRAM CHANNEL
