“It is not satellites in the sky, but pipes on the ocean floor that form the backbone of the world’s economy.”
– Retired US Navy Admiral James Stavridis
Freddie Ponton
21st Century Wire
Modern criminology invites us to revisit our approach to the Nord Stream sabotage and ultimately forces us to explain the decisions made by the Nord Stream saboteurs and the reasons which led them to target the Nord Stream pipelines in the deeper waters of the Danish and Swedish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea, rather than opting for a mission in the considerably shallower waters of the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 could have easily been targeted at once.
This fundamentally raises critical questions regarding the saboteur’s tactical operation, raising the possibility that submarines were involved in the Nord Stream sabotage.
Were the Naval surface activities in the Baltic Sea a mere representation of the covered activities below?
The rationale for the presence of submarines is rooted in their inherent qualities of stealth and discretion – which render them a crucial element in both conventional naval operations and irregular warfare. This distinctive capability enables submarines to influence the trajectory of crisis and military engagements by positioning themselves strategically at critical times and sites to gather intelligence on perceived enemies’ positions or infrastructures, and open valuable options to execute covered operations.
Submarines are among if not the most lethal and effective weapons used by world-leading navies, because of their ability to deliver substantial blows to peer adversaries while seeking to capitalize on their vulnerabilities. It has become apparent that the Nord Stream pipelines were extremely vulnerable to an attack conducted from the bottom of the Baltic Sea when all eyes were focused on NATO naval surface exercises.
In this article, we will explain how a coordinated NATO submarine covert operation was planned and rehearsed to deliver a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that the saboteurs would have devised before prosecuting the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines on September 26, 2022 in the Danish and Swedish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). We will also demonstrate how such an operation fits squarely into NATO’s operational Chain of Command during its BALTOPS 22 naval exercise in the summer of 2022, as well as Northern Coasts 2022 drill which coincided with the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.
Why Choose the Danish and Swedish EEZ?
The addition of both Sweden and Finland into the NATO means that almost all of the Baltic littoral states are now members of the Alliance, leading many western politicians and geopolitical analysts to to label the Baltic Sea as a “NATO lake.”
“[Sweden and Finland] make NATO much more geographically coherent. The Baltic Sea becomes a NATO lake, which is generally useful, also because of the Arctic’s increased importance,” said Ulrike Franke, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, during the 2023 Alliance summit in Vilnius.
More importantly, there is very little that can happen within this maritime domain without the knowledge of the NATO hierarchy – unless of course, it is NATO itself who is conducting an operation, or exercise.
As we will demonstrate, the maritime borders of NATO member states are of great relevance in investigating any underwater demolition, especially any deliberate act of sabotage which took place in the Danish and Swedish EEZ on September 26, 2022.
It becomes even more relevant still, with the realisation that NATO member Germany cannot pretend to be aloof as to nefarious underwater activities at the blast sites of the Nord Stream sabotage.
Our investigation poses a crucial question that requires a thorough answer to clarify the mystery of the Nord Stream sabotage.
MAP: Nord Stream Explosions sites (Source: Sanderson et al, Environmental impact of sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines (2023). DOI: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-2564820/v1)
Q: Why would the saboteurs choose to blow up the Nord Stream pipelines in Denmark and Sweden’s EEZ instead of opting for the much shallower waters of Germany’s EEZ?
- The attack on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in Denmark’s waters could be seen as an attack on a NATO member, potentially invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty. In contrast, sabotaging the pipelines in German waters would be easier but could heavily pressure the German government, especially after it sanctioned Nord Stream 2 before Russia’s military action in Ukraine.
. - The detonation of NS1 and NS2 in Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zone could have impacted Natura 2000 sites, a network of protected areas covering Europe’s most valuable and threatened species and habitats. The Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU) reported the potential endangerment of five protected areas in an attempt to stop the Nord Stream 2 project. The German Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) also highlighted that the pipeline crosses a busy traffic separation zone, suggesting that a Mine/Seabed warfare operation in this sensitive area was simply not an option.
. - It makes sense for the saboteurs to have chosen the 100-meter-deep Bornholm Deep Basin for its depth, which reduces the chance of witnesses. This location allows for better concealment and manoeuvrability for submarines, with quick access to blast sites and escape routes to Poland and Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zones. Submarine operations in the Baltic Sea are managed and deconflicted by the German Submarine Operations Authority (SubOpAuth), in collaboration with NATO and Baltic states.
. - The administrative authority of the German Navy (SubOpAuth) oversees NATO submarine activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland. It monitors and coordinates activities in the Danish and Swedish EEZs to prevent interference or collisions and can set exclusion zones in these EEZs if required. Such authority provided control over the underwater operational theatre.
Nord Stream 2 AG Permit
On October 30, 2019, The Danish Energy Agency (DEA) granted a permit to Nord Stream 2 AG for its Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline project and the construction of two parallel natural gas pipelines in the Danish continental shelf area in the Baltic Sea, southeast of Bornholm.
The permit was issued following a series of consultations with the Danish Working Environment Authority, the Danish Directorate of Fisheries, the Danish Defence Command/Navy Command, the Danish Ministry of Defence Estate Agency, the Danish Geodata Agency, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, the Agency for Culture and Palaces and the Danish Maritime Authority and likely others…
DOCUMENT: The Danish Energy Agency Permit allowing Nord Stream 2 AG to lay the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline in Danish EEZ
permit_nord_stream_2
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In the Permit, we find a section titled 1.2. Conditions and the Article 28 which reads as follows:
“28. Nord Stream 2 AG shall submit the data acquired during the construction and operational phase in the military practice areas to the [Danish] Naval Command. Data from the NATO submarine exercise areas may not be published or shared with third parties without the permission of the [Danish] Naval Command.”
Article 28 of this permit allows us to establish without making any assumptions, that the Danish EEZ waters in which NS2 pipelines were sabotaged, are “NATO Submarine exercise areas.”
IMAGE: Danish Energy Agency (DEA) Permit for Nordstrean 2 AG – Section 1.2. Conditions and Article 28 (Source: Danish Energy Agency)
In the “Military Practice Areas” section of the permit (page 40), the Permit indicates, in a consultation response from the Federal Office for Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services of the German Armed Forces” (BAIUDBw), carried out on behalf of NATO, that “the German Navy administers nine contiguous NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm, which are situated in the Danish, Swedish and Polish exclusive economic zones.”
Furthermore, the permit indicates that the Nord Stream “Route variant NSP2 / NSP2 V2 passes through three submarine areas, whilst NSP2 / NSP2 V1 only passes through two submarine areas in the western peripheral part of [the submarine] areas. The two route variants’ impact on the so-called “safe-bottoming areas,” were deemed by BAIUDBw inconsequential in nature”.
IMAGE: DEA Permit for Nordstrean AG – Page 40 (Source: Danish Energy Agency)
The permit describes the consultation response in which the BAIUDBw stated:
“If the Danish authorities require Nord Stream 2 AG to publish the results of monitoring programmes concerning the environmental conditions during the construction and operating phase within NATO’s submarine exercise areas, the results must not be published for security reasons in relation to NATO partners and friendly nations, unless mutual agreement can be reached with the German Navy concerning the content of the material that is to be published. It shall be ensured that security-relevant and sensitive military data concerning NATO and friendly nations shall not be published.”
BAIUDBw consultation response to the Danish Energy Agency was presented to the Danish Maritime Command which stated that they supported Germany’s demand and that data from the NATO submarine exercise areas was never to be published without the express consent of the German military. The Danish Naval Command proposed that data for approval concerning the NATO Submarine practice areas in the Danish EEZ would be disseminated to the German military via the Danish Naval Command before publication.
According to the Maritime Spatial Planning in the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ):
“The military training areas secured in the spatial plan as reservation areas for defence also include cross-border training areas under NATO administration such as the Bravo[s] submarine search areas in the Baltic Sea. They are located proportionately in the German EEZ and in the Swedish and Danish planning areas. Even though Denmark and Sweden have not defined any spatial designations for defence, the plan is drawn up in consultation with the ministries responsible for defence in order to take into consideration national and alliance defence concerns. As a result, no designations incompatible with the concerns of defence are made”.
In the areas shown in Figure 19 in the annexe document Appendix to the German Spatial Planning Ordinance for the Baltic Sea, we can identify distinct areas which are designated as reservations for defence according to their military purposes including the following submarine diving areas.
- Trolle submarine exercise area
- Walkyria submarine exercise area
- NATO submarine exercise areas (Bravo 2, Bravo 3, Bravo 4)
IMAGE: Figure 19: Designations for national and alliance defence in the Baltic Sea U-Boottauchgebiete = Submarine diving area (Source: BSH)
According to BAIUDBw, NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm are actually part of an integrated system of nine NATO submarine diving areas (NSDA). NATO has transferred the responsibility for these areas and their administration to the German Navy. As we have mentioned above, parts of these NSDA are located in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZ and are used by both NATO members and friendly nations. Six of these NATO submarine diving areas are located entirely or partially within the Polish EEZ. Two of these NATO submarine diving areas are described as “Safe Bottoming Areas”, where emergency measures (e.g.diving and grounding of submarines) can be practised. In these areas, the seabed has been cleared of any ammunition or boulders in particular to ensure maximum safety, making these diving areas the perfect launch pad for conducting a covert seabed irregular warfare operation. (Source: BTS P14).
We note that Poland EEZ borders both Sweden and Danish EEZ, which makes the Military Port Command of Świnoujście (Kołobrzeg), home to the 8th Coastal Defence Flotilla of the Polish Navy, a very strategic location, especially when taking into consideration the fact this military port is the very harbour the Andromeda Yacht and its alleged Ukrainian crew used in September 2022.
Nevertheless, as stated by German Rear Admiral Christian Bock, Commander of the German Operational Flotilla 1 in 2020:
“The German Navy is not only the largest alliance [NATO] navy with access to the Baltic Sea, but above all has detailed knowledge and a lot of experience with the navigationally and tactically demanding operational area above and below water. Diving for long periods of time undetected in the shallow, narrow and busy waters of the Baltic Sea requires very well-trained and experienced crews. Germany is the only Baltic Sea member of the alliance that can use its submarines submerged throughout the Baltic Sea“
It only stands to reason that based on this information and data, a thorough investigation into the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines will require a closer examination of NATO submarine’s activities during these key timeframes – including all of their movements, activities and drills they may have participated in, especially those which occurred before and during the period of BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 22 exercises leading up to the destruction of Nord Stream 1 and 2.
Submarine Operation Authority (SubOpAuth)
SubOpAuth stands for Submarine Operations Authority and can be described as a de-confliction agency for underwater operational movement. The Commander of the SubOpAuth Task Force (CTF 355) may have had Command and Control (C2) over submarine operations carried out in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 22; However, our research indicates that in the context of a NATO-led operation, Germany’s SubOpAuth Commander (CTF355), might have acted as subordinate to the Commander Submarine NATO (COMSUBNATO), based in Northwood UK, at NATO Allied Maritime Command Headquarters, MARCOM.
The ESPOO summary responses report appendix 3 seems to indicate that the German Submarine Operations Authority was located during the period leading to the Nord Stream explosions, at the German Navy Headquarters, DO EXAS, Glucksburg in Germany.
In his February 2023 report, American journalist Seymour Hersh claimed that US Navy divers participated in the Nord Stream sabotage and planted explosives at various locations, known today as ‘Nord Stream blast sites’, during the US-led NATO Maritime Exercise BALTOPS 22.
Although the information we have described above provided some solid background upon which our investigation could rest, we would still need confirmation that NATO Submarine operations were conducted under the leadership of a German submarine Authority during BALTOPS 22, a US Sixth Fleet-led Large Scale Exercise (LSE) conducted under the leadership of USN Vice Admiral Gene Black, Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (COMSTRIKFORNATO), on behalf of General Tod D. Wolters, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). We note that General Wolters was replaced by General Christopher G. Cavoli on July 4, 2022, who also assumed duties as Commander of U.S. European Command, making him the SACEUR and the Commander USEUCOM at the time of the Nord Stream explosions.
Confirming a German SubOpAuth was active during BALTOPS 2022 is not a straightforward task, as NATO and the German Bundeswehr are not known for their transparency when it comes to underwater classified (or not) submarine operations. However, we are now in a position to confirm beyond reasonable doubt that the German Submarine Operations Authority, abbreviated “SubOpAuth”, played a leading role in the deployment of submarines in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs, during BALTOPS 22.
SubOpAuth are typically NATO/Allied organisations established through discrete national bilateral agreements that are often not constrained by the Law of the Sea Convention. They are responsible for Joint submarine operations in the areas covering coastal state(s) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as possible large swathes of ocean or waters.
On June 14, 2022, Danish TV2 a Danish broadcaster based in Bornholm, Denmark was invited on board the Flyvefisken-class diving ship (Y311) Søløven (“Sea Lion”) to report on the activities of the Danish Navy’s Diving Service (Søværnets Dykkertjeneste) in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 22 (5-17 June 2022).
During the filming inside the Danish diving platform, Søløven (Y311), a Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) chart was inadvertently revealed, providing us with a unique look into the BALTOPS 22 construct.
IMAGE: STRIKFORNATO official BALTOPS 22 TASK ORG chart filmed during TV2 broadcast on board of Danish Navy diving platform (Y311) Søløven Y11 on June 14, 2022 (Source: Danish TV2)
This Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) Organisation Chart was made available to BALTOPS 22 participants and has provided our investigation with an invaluable guide for mapping the task forces, groups and units and their commanders. Although the picture was not of the greatest quality, it was still legible and thus provided us with essential information as to the architecture and associated “Chain of Command” (CoC) in place during BALTOPS 22.
We recognise the possibility that this official NATO Organisation Chart dated 06/14/2022 might not be complete, since it indicates “Page 1”, suggesting more pages were available.
However, with this Organisation Chart in hand, we were able to identify the vessels conducting Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Underwater Explosive Ordnance Disposal (UW EOD) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) exercises and associated diving operations during BALTOPS 22.
The BALTOPS 22 Organisation Chart, is colour-coded by Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, which appears to indicate the nature of the activities conducted by Task Groups, Task Units and their various elements.
- Brown-Water Navies (Littoral – Islands – Amphibious)
- Blue-Water Navies ( Open Sea / Ocean)
- Green-Water Navies ( littoral coasts and islands – Amphibious)
- Purple- Water (Joint/Combine Operations – Open Sea & Littoral space under NATO Maritime Command, MARCOM based in Northwood, UK)
CHART: Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) – Official BALTOPS 22 TASK ORG (Organisation Chart) dated June 14, 2022 (Source: Danish TV2). NOTE: “SubOpAuth” command designation highlighted in red by the author.
In the Organisation Chart, the dotted lines between SubOpAuth CTF 355 and the Commander STRIKFORNATO CTF 162 (COMSTRIKFORNATO), suggest that Germany’s SubOpAuth Commander had some form of autonomy, but was coordinating underwater activities operations with both, STRIKFORNATO Commander and the COMSUBNATO NATO at MARCOM headquarter in the UK.
We note that the BALTOPS 22 logo also indicates that submarines were part of the exercise, a detail hidden in plain sight.
IMAGE: Baltic Operations 2022 logo for BALTOPS 22 (Source: STRIKFORNATO)
We are still in the process of confirming who was the lead German commander of SubOpAuth during this exercise. Thus far, we have shortlisted a few possible candidates:
- German Navy Vice Admiral Lenski known as the Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet when operating under NATO command and Vice Chief of the German Navy since March 2022
- Inspector of the German Navy, Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack
- Rear Admiral Henning Faltin (DEU 1 Operational Flotilla – Germany Navy)
In addition, German Navy Captain Frédéric Strauch was in charge of the German Navy 1st Submarine Squadron (1.Ubootgeschwader) during Baltops 22 (Oct 2020 – June 30, 2022). On June 30, 2022, Capt Strauch was replaced by Captain Lars Gößing, making Capt Gößing the commanding officer of the German Navy 1st Submarine Squadron during the German-led naval exercise “Northern Coasts 2022,” which ran from August 29 to September 28 according to this Bundeswehr report, and coincided with the time frame when the Nord Stream explosions were recorded.
To further strengthen our case, note that in 2020, NATO was already reporting on German submarine operations conducted under NATO command in the Eastern Baltic Sea.
Nord Stream: The Baltic’s Routes
The Nord Stream Pipelines terminal in Germany is located in the village of Lubmin, the exit point of the Nord Stream pipelines in the German Baltic Sea, which flows from Russia.
From Lubmin, Nord Stream 1 and 2 (NS1 and NS2) take their journey through Germany’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) before entering Denmark’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where the NS1 and NS2 pipes go their separate ways. NS1 goes through the Danish territorial waters around Bornholm Island (DK), while NS2 remains in the Danish EEZ. Both pairs of pipelines reunite again upon arriving in the Swedish EEZ. The fact that saboteurs chose to conduct their covert operation in the EEZ – and not in Denmark and Sweden’s territorial waters – suggests a calculated decision to exploit the vague jurisdiction which applies to the Exclusive Economic Zone. However, we believe it was also motivated by the undeniable fact, that both coastal states’ EEZ waters are NATO submarine training areas.
IMAGE: Village of Lubmin, Germany, on the Baltic Sea, the arrival point of the Nord Stream gas pipelines (Source: Le Monde)
Nord Stream, EEZ, and Law of the Sea
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal States have authority over seabed activities in their territorial sea, requiring prior approval for operations like submarine cable and pipeline installation, marine scientific research, and hydrographic surveys. In contrast, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), coastal States have sovereign rights to explore and exploit seabed resources and manage natural resources. They also have jurisdiction over marine scientific research and artificial structures but must implement “reasonable” protective measures for submarine cables and pipelines laid by other States. Surface waters in EEZs are considered “access-free” international waters.
MAP: Segmentation of the Maritime Space (Source: French Govt Archives)
More generally, other States retain the freedom of navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, along with “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” associated with these freedoms.
According to a French defense report published in February 2022 by its working group on Seabed Warfare Strategy, “the international seabed area is designated with a unique status aimed at safeguarding this common heritage of mankind. Consequently, activities conducted in this region must be executed for the “benefit of mankind exclusively for peaceful purposes. The exploration and possible exploitation of the Area remain subject to authorisation by the International Seabed Authority (ISBA)”.
UNCLOS and the Protection of Coastal States
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS PART V) prescribes the specific legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone which grand the coastal state (Denmark or Sweden) with:
“sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds”
UNCLOS Article 58 confirms the Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone, and part 1 reads as follows:
“1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”
IMAGE: Submarine USS Montpelier and elite divers conducting an expeditionary ordnance exercise to load MK 67 submarine-launched mobile mine. Flags appearing in the original picture were removed by the author (Source: US Sixth Fleet)
Seabed Warfare
The doctrine of freedom of the seas was dominant until the necessity for territorial claims emerged in the latter half of the 20th century. This trend of appropriation extends to the seabed, driven by both economic and geopolitical motivations. Over time, the seabed of the Baltic Sea has increasingly served as a battleground for power dynamics, with the rising interest in its unique characteristics fostering the emergence of covert or hybrid operational strategies. This situation has prompted NATO navies to engage in various seabed activities to protect the interests of the Alliance and ensure the operational autonomy of the armed forces of its member states.
“The combined clandestine capabilities of Naval Special Operations Forces and submarines provide an asymmetric advantage that bolsters the Navy’s lethality from the sea,” said Rear Adm. Anthony Carullo, Director of Maritime Operations, U.S. Sixth Fleet and Commander, Submarine Group 8 (Source: TWZ)
A 2022 report from the French Defense indicates that the submarine systems market is predominantly controlled by American entities, which hold a 40% share, while European stakeholders account for 33%. Several companies within this sector report revenues exceeding $3 billion dollars. Notably, over one-third (35%) of European firms involved in submarine technology are based in the United Kingdom, engaging in complementary activities across nearly all segments of submarine technology. Germany ranks as the second largest contributor among European participants. In contrast, the sonobuoy market is primarily led by established British and American companies.
Our research centres on the activities occurring within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Denmark and Sweden, as these regions encompass the locations of the Nord Stream explosion sites. Additionally, we have factored in the nearby German and Polish EEZs and their associated underwater operations.
The Danish EEZ can be divided into three sub-regions: 1) the Danish parts of the North Sea and Skagerrak, 2) the Danish parts of the Kattegat, and 3) the Danish parts of the western Baltic Sea including the marine waters around Bornholm, where the explosion(s) related to the Nord Stream sabotage were recorded.
COMSUBNATO and TUSWC
In 2022, Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack, USA Navy was the NATO Submarine Operational Commander also known as the “COMSUBNATO”, who operates under NATO within the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM).
During BALTOPS 22, it is very likely that the NATO Submarine Force Commander (COMSUBNATO) had operational command, working alongside a designated subordinate commander from Germany’s SubOpAuth, who would have played a crucial in deconflicting a specific operational area located in the Danish and Swedish EEZ waters. The BALTOPS 22 Organisation Chart suggest that German SubOpAuth and its naval Commander Task Force (CTF-355) were chosen to operate as the subordinate OPCON for all submarines assigned to specific NATO missions in the Baltic Sea during the events that led up to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines.
In such a scenario, Germany’s SubOpAuth would be tasked by the Alliance to coordinate NATO submarine activities including submarine (and potentially Min Subs) operating with battle groups and participating in naval, joint, or allied exercises such as Open Spirit 22, BALTOPS 22, Northern Coasts 22, and Polish-led naval exercise, Shark/Rekin 22.
The Bornholm Deep Basin (100 m) is the deepest water surrounding the Nord Stream blast sites, making it a perfect site to hide, or deploy, expert deep-sea divers from a submarine or MiniSub. Other areas such as the Gulf of Gdansk (112 m), Western Gotland Basin (459 m) or the Easter Gotland Basin (248 m) would have provided additional cover opportunities.
MAP: Baltic Sea EEZ and Depths (Source: Polish Geological Institute)
MAP: Figure 9-21. Military areas around Energy Island Bornholm project (Source P82: Energy Island Bornholm)
CHART: Nordstream Pipelines depth profile (Source: ESPOO Report)
It is essential to determine who had Submarine Operation Control (OPCON) authority and associated Combatant Commands authority (COCOMs), before and during the period that led to the Nord Stream sabotage. Submarine OPCON includes responsibility for overall area-wide waterspace management (WSM) and prevention of mutual interference (PMI) for submarine operations conducted within the designated operational area of responsibility.
Based on the information extracted from the Danish Energy Agency’s permit granted to Nord Stream 2 AG, the German Maritime Operations Command Center would have had control over underwater movements and activities conducted in the German, Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZ, during NATO’s BALTOPS 22 exercise in June 2022, and during German-led Northern Coasts 2022 Naval exercise, who according to a Bundeswehr article dated 13 October 2022, began on 29 August 2022, and ended on Wednesday, 28 September 2022, two days after the Nord Stream explosions.
According to the US Navy record of their Commander Submarine Force Atlantic, in 2022 the COMSUBNATO was Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack, who was also the Deputy Commander, Submarine Group 8 (COMSUBGRU-8) under Task Force 69 (CTF 69). Before becoming the commander, of submarines, NATO, Northwood, United Kingdom, Rear Admiral Stephen G Mack was serving as chief of staff, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and chief of staff, U.S. Strategic Command Special Activities Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia. Mack led the huge anti-submarine warfare exercise Dynamic Mangoose 2022 in the waters of the GIUK Gap, between Iceland and Norway, coinciding with the arrival of US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Gilday who travelled to Iceland, June 13-15 before heading to Germany. It’s important to note, that CNO Gilday was at that time the Chief Naval Advisor (Naval Aid) to President Joe Biden.
US Navy Rear Admiral Stephen Mack’s superior was John D. Craddock, the Commander, Task Force 69 (Apr 2021 – Dec 2023), who was responsible for submarine warfare operations in the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM Areas of Responsibility, during the period and events that led to the destruction of the Nord Stream Pipelines.
According to the Defense Aerospace outlet 2016 report, Germany – Poland (GE-POL) SubOpAuth was to be integrated into the German Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) in Glucksburg Germany, and include at least two Polish naval officers. Organizationally part of the German Maritime Operations Centre” (MOC), the “GE-POL SubOpAuth” exercises binational operational control over both German and Polish submarine operations. In other words, Poland and German submariners would have operated under the German Submarine Operations Authority.
One of the greatest benefits the Polish Navy acquired from this cooperation was the ability to connect its submarines to the German guidance systems i.e. the ‘Submarine Broadcast Control Authority’. According to the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI), the “Broadcast Control Authority (BCA) is a portion of the NATO Very Low-Frequency Minimum Shift Keying NATO (VLF MSK system or new version), which is a ‘Mission Critical System’. This system directly supports or escalates command, control or intelligence functions essential for the successful execution of the operational mission. It is particularly vital for the dissemination of Water Space Management (WSM) and Prevention of Mutual Interference (PMI) information”.
SubOpAuth is also responsible for declaring the exclusion zones ahead of underwater operations, exercises and underwater movements in its area of responsibility, including several EEZs in the Baltic Sea. Based on the BALTOPS 22 Organisation Chart and our knowledge of the unique US submarine chain of command, the German SubOpAuth would have coordinated planned underwater operations (classified or not) with SHAPE, STRIKFORNATO, MARCOM, and with coastal member states such as Denmark and Sweden.
Hydro International, a leading worldwide magazine focusing on hydrography, stated in an article that:
“For the Navy, this probity (exclusion zone) permits safer submarine routing, AUV or UUV deployment and diving operations”, all considered vital tools, equipment and skills required for seabed operations.
This US Naval Institute article indicates that “Modern undersea warfare goes far beyond the traditional defensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) to protect the carrier against enemy attack submarines. Although undersea warfare (USW) has diverged from Navy doctrine, the article states:
“…it seeks to integrate manned and unmanned undersea platforms to deliver effects against enemy forces from seabed infrastructure to surface and land targets”.
“USW involves submarines, surface units, and air platforms and sensors”.
Based on the same report, the US appears to have “four Theater Undersea Warfare Commanders (TUSWCs) across the numbered fleets, dual-hatted with the commander, submarine group, who holds submarine operating authority (SubOpAuth). The TUSWC staff coordinates U.S. and allied submarines in the assigned waterspace, providing tactical control of assigned U.S. and allied ASW surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft, and processes acoustic information from fixed and mobile sensors.”
According to the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI), Very Low Frequency (VLF) Broadcast services provide Submarine Operating Authorities (SUBOPAUTH) with robust, secure and timely message delivery within the NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR), to ensure effective Command and Control (C2) of sub-surface forces and operations.
In this context, the Nord Stream sabotage must be seen as a combination of well-coordinated air, surface and sub-surface skills and expertise.
In other words, this means NATO Submarine Commander, COMSUBNATO Rear Admiral Stephen G Mack was a US Theatre Undersea Warfare Commander (TUSWCs) during BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 2022, which suggests that Rear Admiral Mack had submarine operating authority (SubOpAuth) in European theatre including the Baltic Sea. This is an important piece of information because the Nord Stream sabotage would fall under the category of clandestine unconventional or irregular undersea warfare activities, well within the range of a TUSWC Commander.
This information is also crucial to identify the German SubOpAuth Commander (CTF 355) which would have had to be either the US COMSUBNATO Rear Admiral Stephen G Mack or a German subordinate commander operating under TUSWC during BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 2022.
DEU MARFOR (Germany)
DEU MAFOR (“German Maritime Forces Staff”) in Rostock is the military maritime command where Germany and its NATO Partners plan and implement maritime operations and naval exercises.
The German Submarine Squadron 1 is based in Eckernförde and operates six Type 212A submarines, one Elbe class tender, and the Oste class intelligence collectors. Some of the leadership and staff of the DEU Flotilla 1 are based at the Maritime Command Center authority in Kiel, Germany, however, the DEU Flotilla 1 (EF 1 ) is subordinate to the Head of the Operations Department at the Naval Command in Rostock in Germany, where the Joint Planning and implementation of German-led Naval exercises with NATO allies, such as Northern Coasts 2022, are conceived.
IMAGE: DEU MARFOR: German Navy’s Maritime Command Center in Rostock, Germany (Source: Bundeswehr)
According to this Bundeswehr report, “since 1st October 2024, DEU MARFOR German Maritime Forces have taken over the NATO function of Commander Task Force Baltic, or CTF Commander Task Force Baltic for short, for the Baltic Sea region”. This German tactical-level headquarters was certified maritime headquarters by NATO in 2023.
Based on available information, we have determined that DEU MARFOR was involved to a great extent in the planning of Northern Coasts 2022 exercises with the help of NATO Allied Maritime Command MARCOM, and other NATO partners. However, DEU MARFOR wasn’t NATO certified in 2022 meaning that the German contribution to STRIKFORNATO US led Naval exercise Baltops 22, wasn’t linked to its overall planning but rather a contribution as listed below:
- SubOpAuth Commander (CTF-355) + Submarine(s)
- Command and Control for Task Group CO SACHSEN (TG 162.50) F 219 FGS Sachsen and German Corvette FGS Braunschweig (F260)
- Mine Sweepers/Hunters for COMBALTRON (MCM and Minehunter FGS Fulda (M1058) and Minesweeper FGS Homburg (M1069)
The fact that the Nord Stream explosions occurred under the watch of the German Navy and MARCOM during German-led Northern Coasts 2022 is of great concern. Not only it is unthinkable that Germany wasn’t aware of the air, surface and subsurface activities taking place in the Baltic Sea around that time but, it is even harder to believe, if not inconceivable, that MARCOM was left in the dark.
NATO Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters in Germany (COE CSW)
Between 2019 and 2020 NATO Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters in Germany (COE CSW) cooperated with the NATO Naval Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence, located in the coastal port city of Ostend, Belgium but also with the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS COE) in Norfolk, VA, USA, and the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (STO CMRE),
“The Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW) is an international military organization founded to support NATO’s transformation program. As part of the NATO Centres of Excellence program, it is co-located with the staff of the German Einsatzflottille 1 (Ef1) in Kiel whose commander has command over Germany Submarine Squadron 1. The Commander EF1 is also the Director of the NATO-accredited Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW)”. (source)
In 2019, COE CSW was asked to develop at the behest of the Italian Navy, a concept of operation for the “Employment of Automated Underwater Vehicles (AUV) in Covert Naval Mine Countermeasure Operations in support of an Amphibious Operation.
To our knowledge, the conceptual study paper was never disclosed to the public.
IMAGE: 2019, The Italian Navy requested COE CSW, a NATO Centre of Excellence in Germany to produce a comprehensive study about the Employment of AUVs in covert naval Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Operations in support of an Amphibious Operation. (Source: COE CSW)
We believe this request for this very specific study might have originated from the Italian Navy MCM (Mine Countermeasures) Force Command and the Naval Mine Warfare Training and Evaluation Centre (MARICENDRAG) based in La Spezia Naval Base, Italy which often works with the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (STO-CMRE), also located in La Spezia. STO- CMRE is a NATO Undersea Warfare Research Centre and an executive body of NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO) that has been involved for years in the development of autonomous underwater vehicles conducting mine countermeasure (MCM) missions and support to anti-submarine warfare.
The COE CSW in Germany is deeply embedded in a NATO network, in particular with maritime entities such as NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) in Northwood, UK, and the German DEU Flotilla 1, amongst many others, as described above.
While the presentation of the above information regarding the development of this warfare operation concept may deviate from our main focus, we acknowledge its significance, which will become more evident later on in our forthcoming articles regarding the activities of an Expeditionary Mine Countermeasure Unit (ExMCM), which participated in the US-led naval exercises BALTOPS 22, and very likely in the German-led Northern Coasts 2022.
IMAGE September 17, 2022, German-led exercise starts in Northern Coasts 2022 in Klaipėda, Lithuania (Source: Lithuanian Armed Forces)
‘MOP-UP OPERATIONS’
Additionally, we believe some elements of this ExMCM elements were involved in the underwater post-blast forensic “mopping-up operation” conducted within the exclusive economic zones of Sweden and Denmark, following the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines.
For instance, the Expeditionary Exploitation Unit 1 (EXU-1) and the Explosive Ordnance (EOD Mobile Unit 3) featured in the BALTOPS 22 Organisation Chart under the Explosive Ordnance Task Unit (TG 162.60.30), were reported conducting maritime post-blast investigation course at Naval Air Station (NAS) Key West, Florida, earlier that year – training with the U.K. Royal Navy Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (Surface Fleet DTXG Squadrons), along with three U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.
During BALTOPS 22, these units operated under US Sixth Fleet Task Group Commander MCM Detachment, USN Captain Sam Brasfield, from US Naval Base in Rota Spain. Capt Brasfield is the former commander of the Naval Diving Salvage Training Centre in Panama City, Florida (NDSTC), which reports to the Center for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Diving (CENEODDIVE) located in Naval Support Activity Panama City.
Furthermore, the Commander of Expeditionary Logistics CTF-68 HQ, who is also featured in the BALTOPS 22 Organisation Chart, was USN Cmdr, Capt Cameron Chen, who also happened to be a former Commander at NDSTC in Panama City. It is hard not to draw some parallels with Seymour Hersh’s report which too emphasises the alleged involvement of US Navy divers from Panama City, in the Nord Stream sabotage.
Additionally, MCM subject matter experts from the US Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City, A42 Division (NSWC PCD) provided support to these Units during BALTOPS 22, including the planning of MCM operations which they coordinated from a Diving Tactical Operations Center set up in Ralvunda, Sweden during BALTOPS 22.
Later in our investigation, we will provide a detailed breakdown of the Chain of Command that was in place during NATO naval exercises in the Baltic Sea in 2022 and much more…
The idea that a covert operation utilizing an ExMCM Unit was carried out with the support of an Amphibious Ready Group and a submarine(s) (or mini-subs) during NATO naval exercises may appear unlikely at first glance. However, our investigation into the Nord Stream sabotage now provides compelling evidence for the existence of Seabed Mine Warfare and Underwater Demolition Operations. These activities were conducted during maritime exercises led by NATO member states, thereby aligning squarely with the principles of Maritime Irregular Warfare.
It is a well-established fact that the United States Navy engages in covert, unacknowledged, and unscheduled operations during NATO Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) maritime exercises in Europe. This assertion is supported by publicly available information, and also further corroborated by off-the-record conversations by our investigative team with both former and active duty NATO officers, and EOD commanders.
German Submarine & NATO
Submarines play a critical role in national security and regional military operations conducted in the Baltic Sea.
In May 2020 the Bundeswehr reported that German submarines such as the U33 Type 212A submarine had been subordinated to MARCOM, NATO Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, England. Since then, Germany and other nations’ submarines have been placed under NATO to monitor underwater activities in the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea.
Germany’s knowledge of the Baltic Seabed is unmatchable hence the reason why its submarines are still today a strategic element of NATO Submarine-based intelligence gathering, in support of the Alliance Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) missions and subsurface covert operations in the Baltic Sea.
IMAGE: U-33 (S183), a third Type 212A submarine of the German Navy bearing a NATO flag (Source: Bundeswehr)
The German Class 212A submarines, second generation such as U-36 (S186) and U-35 (S185) who participated in Operation Irini (12 June 2021 to 14 December 2021), were fitted with advanced long-range sonar systems and distinctive propulsion mechanisms, and possess the capability to conduct prolonged covert operations. This enables them to gather comprehensive intelligence regarding the conditions in maritime or coastal regions. Additionally, their design renders them particularly suitable for the discreet transportation of special forces divers or other specialised operators, to their operational locations. The 212A submarines can stay submerged for up to three weeks without snorkelling with a range of up to 8000 nautical miles (15,000 km) and a safe operation depth of 250 meters (820 ft). These submarines are remarkably silent and stealthy.
According to HISutton, the U212-AIP-Submarines (newer generation) are equipped with “a 4-person (divers) lock-out chamber located in the sail and in one of the torpedo tubes which has been enlarged for special forces equipment” making the 212 A submarine an ideal choice for covert operations. “Pressure containers can be carried on either side, abreast of the LOX tanks behind the sail. Two small hangars can be mounted on either side near the stern, which suggests that the submarine has to be stationary to use them. This may be on the sea bed, or the surface” adds HiSutton.
These externally accessible transport containers are designed to address the necessity for supplementary space for divers materials and equipment, which is crucial for divers engaged in covert operations. In addition to enhancing operational efficiency, which the diving lock-out chamber will certainly facilitate, it also fosters deeper collaboration with NATO forces which lack the “torpedo tube” procedure in their operational capabilities.
IMAGE: May 2020, stealth & sophistication: German Type-212 submarine (Source: HiSutton)
IMAGE: German U212A Batch II submarine with 4 Divers “Lockout Chamber” (No 12) (Source: HiSutton)
IMAGE: US Navy Divers taking part in lock-out procedures, entering a submerged Submarine (Source: Navy SEALs)
Later in our investigation, we will reveal more information on NATO member states submarine activities during 2022 in the Baltic Sea, before, and during the period that led to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines.
Conclusions
We anticipate generating additional evidence and supporting data that bolster our hypothesis regarding the possibility that the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines was allegedly orchestrated under the auspices of NATO leadership.
We have made very few assumptions if at all, and have sought to present our case rationally using facts and open-source data – which we hope will lead to a better understanding of the underwater world and subsequent activities conducted in the Baltic Sea Exclusive Economic Zones. We hope this will help explain some of the circumstances and events that led to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines, which should have long been characterised as an act of terrorism.
“Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”
Terrorism has become a serious threat characterized by its unpredictable nature, variety of forms, and severe effects on the public, especially when it is politically motivated in an attempt to gain support for the ’cause’ or create damage designed to punish or influence the target population.
What is undeniable is the fact that submarines, Mini Subs, and their combat divers, remain the most discreet and efficient piece of military equipment able to conduct irregular mine warfare operations covertly.
We believe it was important to first lay some solid foundation, before reporting on suspicious surface and sub-surface activities involving NATO submarines and subsequent surface support vessels.
In the EU, Belgium and the Dutch Navy are considered the leading MCM experts in this domain and as for Seabed Warfare, the UK and Germany are certainly at the forefront.
The Alliance’s Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting Strategy (AJP-3.9, November 2021), which we will analyze in our forthcoming report, suggest prior knowledge and consent from the nations whose Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters harbour the Nord Stream pipelines, or what remains of them.
National approvals for sensitive targets located in NATO member state waters or NATO-friendly state waters, appear to imply the use of the NATO STAR process (Page 65-66), by which the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) would have had to discuss and seek the approval of Sweden and Denmark, to characterise the Nord Stream pipelines as a potential target up for demolition in their waters, since EEZ’s subsurface waters and seabed falls under both coastal States jurisdictions.
Suffice to say, NATO’s use of Sweden and Denmark EEZ waters for submarine operations must be included in any serious Nord Stream investigation, as is the integration of Germany’s Submarine Operation Authority (SubOpAuth) in this analysis.
To be continued…
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Author Freddie Ponton is an independent researcher and journalist and special constibutor to 21st Century Wire. See more Freddie’s work in his 21WIRE archive here.
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