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Revealed: Israel Has Hamas Oct 7 Plans One Year Before, But Did Nothing

If true, this would not be surprising, considering other Israeli failure both on the battlefield, and in their intelligence operations.

Is has been reported in a recent edition of the New York Times that the Hamas Oct. 7 operation against the Israeli occupiers stationed along the Gaza security wall, which later known as “Al Aqsa Flood”,  was known to Israeli intelligence over a year before the event commenced. Code-named “Jericho Wall” by the Israeli, it laid out a detailed plan for an barrage of rockets and drones intended to overwhelm Israeli security measures, allowing Palestinian Resistance fighters to enter Israeli occupied territory with rudimentary paragliders, motorcylces, as well as on foot, storming key military outposts and taking hostages.

This is certainly an interesting revelation, but why is this being reported now? Who benefits?

Surely it’s an embarrassment to the Israeli government and the problematic disposition of Prime Minister Benjamen Netanyahu.

Is this a strategic leak designed to open the exit door for the convenient ejection of Netanyahu?

More from their report here…

“Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago”

Ronen Bergman and 

Israeli officials obtained Hamas’s battle plan for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack more than a year before it happened, documents, emails and interviews show. But Israeli military and intelligence officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, considering it too difficult for Hamas to carry out.

The approximately 40-page document, which the Israeli authorities code-named “Jericho Wall,” outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people.

The translated document, which was reviewed by The New York Times, did not set a date for the attack, but described a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.

Hamas followed the blueprint with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot — all of which happened on Oct. 7.

The plan also included details about the location and size of Israeli military forces, communication hubs and other sensitive information, raising questions about how Hamas gathered its intelligence and whether there were leaks inside the Israeli security establishment.

The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.

Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.

“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.

Then, in July, just three months before the attacks, a veteran analyst with Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, warned that Hamas had conducted an intense, daylong training exercise that appeared similar to what was outlined in the blueprint.

But a colonel in the Gaza division brushed off her concerns, according to encrypted emails viewed by The Times.

“I utterly refute that the scenario is imaginary,” the analyst wrote in the email exchanges. The Hamas training exercise, she said, fully matched “the content of Jericho Wall.”

“It is a plan designed to start a war,” she added. “It’s not just a raid on a village.”

Officials privately concede that, had the military taken these warnings seriously and redirected significant reinforcements to the south, where Hamas attacked, Israel could have blunted the attacks or possibly even prevented them…

Read more at the New York Times




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