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Rokh Solis : Analyse d'un mode opératoire informationnel ayant ciblé les élections municipales de mars 2026

Secrétariat général de la défense
et de la sécurité nationale



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SYNTHESIS

In March 2026, VIGINUM detected the existence of a new **informational operating method** (ME), **baptized *Rokh Solis***, structured around a network of sites *web* and social media accounts aimed at denigrating the **political party *France Unbowed*** (LFI), **as well as several of its candidates for the municipal elections of March 15 and 22, 2026**. Investigations conducted by VIGINUM demonstrate that **The campaign conducted using this MOI meets the criteria for foreign digital interference.**

Four of the sites *web* in question – ***blogdesophie.com, delogupourpalestine.com, piquemalzero.com*** And ***lalternative2026.com*** – present **common technical characteristics** (same IP address, registration date, image metadata, *etc.*) and benefit from **coordinated relays** on *TikTok, Instagram, X* And *Facebook* by accounts presenting several **markers of inauthenticity**. Furthermore, the analyses carried out on the site *lalternative2026.com* and on accounts associated with ME *Rokh Solis* allow two other sites to be linked to this same ecosystem: ***forsane-alizza.eu*** (showing his support for *lalternative2026.com*), And ***rcn-france.org*** (which, on the contrary, raises awareness of the existence of *lalternative2026.com*).

Resolutely hostile, the **editorial line** this ecosystem is part of a general strategy of discrediting *France Unbowed*, and the denigration of its candidates and members of parliament Sébastien DELOGU, François PIQUEMAL and David GUIRAUD, respectively in Marseille, Toulouse, Roubaix. Furthermore, the second part of the scheme (*rcn-france.org* And *forsane-alizza.eu*) puts two opposing ideological positions side by side, with on one side a movement with a conservative, identitarian and sovereignist line and, on the other side, a pseudo radical Islamist group, aiming to polarize the national public debate by instrumentalizing the Muslim community.

Beyond the digital realm, an account *TikTok* associated with ***rcn-france.org*** promoted **actions in the physical sphere in Paris**. A similar operation, in particular *via* The display of collages in Marseille was promoted by the account *X @Sophie'sBlog*. Despite the variety of digital assets, numerous attempts at artificial amplification, and the lateralization of foreign digital interference operations across multiple platforms, the operations of the MOI *Rokh Solis* have benefited from little online visibility in the lead-up to the 2026 municipal elections.

Finally, regarding the **involvement of a foreign actor** VIGINUM has identified several **technical markers of foreignness**: **presence of Hebrew characters** in a website's metadata, **location of the account in Israel** *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr*, and **sharing hashtags and publications associated with the pro-Israel organization ELNET** indicating the involvement, *at a minimum* indirect, from a foreign actor.

Several technical elements have guided VIGINUM's investigations towards a **Israeli private entity named *Blackcore*** whose digital influence strategies are similar to those observed in information campaigns conducted using the MOI *Rokh Solis*. The investigations conducted on this company have revealed a suite of artificial amplification tools on social media, embedded within an ecosystem of private Israeli cybersecurity entities. At this stage, the scope of this environment prevents the precise identification and characterization of the exact role of the operators behind the MOI (Movement of Interest). *Rokh Solis*.

1. CLEARLY INACCURATE OR MISLEADING NARRATIVES AND CONTENT

The operators of the MOI *Rokh Solis* appear to have employed two distinct narrative strategies aimed at denigrating the political party *France Unbowed* (LFI) and some of its candidates in the 2026 municipal elections, as well as polarizing the digital public debate around divisive themes, in particular by accusing the LFI party of Muslim communitarianism. These two narrative strategies have given rise to several ecosystems of digital assets whose deployment, behavior and certain amplification measures exhibit numerous markers of coordination and inauthenticity (cf. [Part 2](#)).

1.1. Denigration of the LFI political party and its candidates

The analysis of the editorial line of the various digital assets used by the operators of *Rokh Solis* allows us to highlight their objectives: to damage the reputation of LFI and some of its candidates, and to polarize the national public debate by instrumentalizing the Muslim community.

On the one hand, the publication of a list of candidates from *France Unbowed* or affiliates, on the website *lalternative2026.com* This is part of a broader strategy to discredit the party. This approach relies in particular on accusations of communitarianism leveled against LFI, presented as a central characteristic of the policies the party seeks to promote, both locally and nationally.

On the other hand, targeted attacks against specific LFI candidates in the municipal elections were carried out to damage their reputations and bolster overall criticism of the party. Thus, through demonstrably inaccurate or misleading narratives supporting accusations of crimes, three LFI candidates were directly targeted by the MOI's main digital assets. *Rokh Solis*: Sébastien DELOGU, François PIQUEMAL and David GUIRAUD, respectively candidates in the municipal elections of Marseille, Toulouse and Roubaix.

ME's Digital Assets	Target	Narrative
The site <i>blogdesophie.com</i> , the X accounts and Facebook "Sophie's Blog"	Sébastien DELOGU	Accusation of rape.
The site <i>delogupourpalestine.com</i>	Sébastien DELOGU	Presentation of a letter purportedly written by the LFI candidate who would offer for sale a calendar featuring photos of himself, some of whom would be stripped naked, in order to "to dedicate the sale of [his] photographs to direct support for the population from Gaza"
Two pages Facebook and the site <i>piquemalzero.com</i>	François PIQUEMAL	Accusations of pedophilia, violence, and support for Hamas terrorist acts, impersonating a child protection association.
Two pages Facebook	David GUIRAUD	Denunciation of pro-Palestinian stances in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas.

1.2. Polarization of the digital public debate *via* the exploitation of the Muslim community

To lend credibility to the site's deployment *alternative2026.com*, also indirectly targeting the LFI party, the MOI operators *Rokh Solih* have created two distinct digital ecosystems with antagonistic narratives.

The first ecosystem is structured around a purported project, "The Alternative 2026", embodied by the domain name *alternative2026.com*. This document promotes a communitarian political approach in favor of the Muslim population during the municipal elections, citing a list of LFI candidates presented as supporting this program. This discourse thus advocates elements such as the establishment of a religious legal system and the facilitation of the wearing of religious symbols. The objective presented on *alternative2026.com* The aim would be "to help Muslim citizens identify, in each city, the candidate who best represents their interests." The juxtaposition of these principles with a list of LFI or affiliated candidates insidiously suggests complicity between the party and the communitarian demands of this project.

Furthermore, another part of the same ecosystem aimed to promote "The 2026 Alternative." To this end, MOI operators created digital assets borrowing the name of a now-dissolved radical Islamist group, "Forsane Alizza."¹ these assets were intended to convey narratives inspired by the Salafist ideological foundation of this group, but also to commend the initiative in favor of the Muslim community in France led by *alternative2026.com*.

The construction of this community-based stance then facilitated the establishment of a second, antagonistic ecosystem. Organized around a supposed association called "National Catholic Renaissance," with a sovereignist, identitarian, Catholic, and conservative stance, this ecosystem disseminated an alarmist discourse on the "decline of France" and warned against "the rise of radical Islamism," in particular. *via* the denunciation of the site *alternative2026.com*.

This narrative dialectic is probably intended to generate online engagement, in order to increase the visibility of these two spheres and hopefully *in fine* polarize the digital public debate on the question of the place of the Muslim community in French society.

¹*Forsane Alizza* or "Knights of Pride", was a radical Islamist group presenting itself as an association since 2010. The group consisted of about fifteen individuals active in France between 2010 and 2012. The activities of this group were structured mainly around online actions and demonstrations in the physical sphere, on essentially anti-Semitic and anti-blasphemous themes.

2. ARTIFICIAL OR AUTOMATED, MASSIVE AND DELIBERATE DISSEMINATION DEVICE

Between February 9 and 19, 2026, VIGINUM detected the creation of the four sites *web* designed to target the LFI party and some of its candidates in the context of the 2026 municipal elections. These four sites share common technical characteristics, allowing us to state with a high level of confidence that they form a single ecosystem, potentially created by the same operator (see appendices).^{5.1} And^{5.2} These sites are: *blogdesophie.com*, *delogupourpalestine.com*, *piquemalzero.com* and *lalternative2026.com*.

The investigations conducted by VIGINUM have notably established that the site *blogdesophie.com* shared several common technical elements with the site *lalternative2026.com*:

- Both sites were registered on February 9, 2026 and are hosted on the same IP address.²;
- images generated by the same large language model (LLM) *Gemini* were uploaded to these two sites;
- an image uploaded to the site *blogdesophie.com* includes the same author name ("usman latif") as eight images present on the sites *lalternative2026.com* and *delogupourpalestine.com*. These visuals were all generated via the tool *Canva*.³

The deployment of these sites was accompanied, in particular, by the creation of pages *Facebook* and accounts on *X*, *Instagram* and *TikTok*.

VIGINUM detected the presence of two other sites associated with this ecosystem: *rcn-france.com* and *forsane-alizza.eu*. As mentioned above, the first embodies the supposed showcase of a French political movement with a conservative and sovereigntist editorial line, denouncing in particular the existence of the project supposedly represented by *lalternative2026.com*. As for the second, it presents itself as the resurgence of a radical French Islamist group, welcoming the initiative in favor of the Muslim community in France led by *lalternative2026.com*.

The visibility of the various digital assets mentioned above has remained low, despite numerous attempts at artificial amplification.

2.1. Targeting LFI candidates for the mayoral elections in Marseille, Toulouse and Roubaix

2.1.1. *blogdesophie.com*

The domain name *blogdesophie.com* was created on February 9, 2026 and is protected by the anonymization service *Cloudflare*. Consisting of a single page, the site presents itself as the blog of an alleged former collaborator of Sébastien DELOGU, who is making rape accusations against him and thus seeking to break "the silence".⁴ This blog. This site also links to an account.


²198.177.120[.]188. The real IP addresses of the MOI sites *Rokh Solis* are protected by the anonymization service *Cloudflare*. These sites use technology *WordPress*. It is possible to send a so-called "pingback", in order to reveal their real IP address. Indeed, unless these sites have disabled the "pingbacks", the server *WordPress* will directly send a response to this request, bypassing the service *Cloudflare*, thus revealing their real address.

³*Canva Pty Ltd* is an Australian company offering online graphic design products.

⁴<https://archive.ph/KebHZ>.

⁵The sites *lalternative2026.com*, *delogupourpalestine.com* and *piquemalzero.com* are hosted behind the anonymization service *Cloudflare* on the pair of name servers *carol.ns.cloudflare.com* and *simon.ns.cloudflare.com*.

X and a page Facebook both indicating a link to the site *web* in their biography and disseminating *hashtags* commons⁷, of the Photos of leaflets posted in Marseille, as well as a video testimony from this alleged victim. The testimony indicates that the name Sophie is a pseudonym, used out of fear of reprisals from the member of parliament for the seventh constituency of Bouches-du-Rhône.



Screenshot of what is likely the site administrator's desktop
blogdesophie.com

A screenshot of the site administrator's desktop elsewhere having been uploaded by mistake to *blogdesophie.com* allowing us to see a number of tools used by at least one of the operators of this campaign, as well as a date format not usually used in France ("2026/2/12").

The page Facebook, "Sophie's Blog", was created on February 19, 2026. Between that date and March 5, 2026, the page published seven posts, including a video published on February 27 of a woman who testifies, with her back to the camera and with a modified voice, about the alleged rape.



Page Facebook "Sophie's Blog" indicating the link to the site *blogdesophie.com*

Furthermore, VIGINUM detected the distribution of nine photos of leaflets apparently posted in Marseille⁸, which include a QR code redirecting to the site *blogdesophie.com*. The leaflets photographed at Marseille has a graphic charter similar to the leaflet shared by the account *TikTok*

*@renaissancecatholiquefr*⁹ in a publication dated February 9, 2026 (see part 2.2.2). The page Facebook also disseminated other content that was probably generated via a generative artificial intelligence tool, as well as a screenshot of an alleged conversation with Sébastien DELOGU. Several of these posts appear to have been artificially and coordinatedly amplified by a network of 500 pages and accounts Facebook which exhibit markers of inauthenticity¹⁰.

The account *X @Sophie'sBlog0* was created on March 6, 2025, and its username was changed on February 18, 2026. Between February 28 and March 4, 2026, the same content as on the page Facebook are broadcast there¹¹. On three occasions, the count *X* challenged Sébastien DELOGU, by responding to three of his publications.

⁶<https://archive.ph/bm9s7> (facebook.com/LeBlogdeSophie0) And <https://archive.ph/IBHmA> (x.com/Sophie'sBlog0).

⁷#sebastiendelogu, #balancetonporc, #leblogdesophie, #marseillemeritemieux, #marseillevote, #BlogdeSophie.

⁸After investigations, VIGINUM was able to locate five locations where the leaflets were placed: 67 Cours Julien, 13006 Marseille; 39 Cours Julien, at the level of "L'Espace Julien"; 10 rue Pierre Mouren, 13007 Marseille; 396 rue d'Endoume, 13007 Marseille; 43°17'32.3"N 5°21'50.5"E / Tunnel under Boulevard Charles Livon.


⁹<https://archive.ph/reaqI>.

¹⁰The first publication was notably liked by 500 pages Facebook from the day of its creation, a significant number of pages had no subscribers and defined themselves as beauty pages.

¹¹<https://archive.ph/EY3HM>, <https://archive.ph/IBHmA>, <https://archive.ph/IpLOd>.

2.1.2. delogupourpalestine.com

The domain named delogupourpalestine.com¹², filed on February 19, 2026, used the anonymization service *Cloudflare* and uses the same *WordPress* template that the site blogdesophie.com visible, for example, by accessing the site author's profile¹³ (see below). VIGINUM's investigations have identified a page *Facebook* The page titled "Who is Sébastien Delogu?", also created on February 9, 2026, participates in the dissemination of content targeting the MP. Unlike other pages in the system, this one contains errors in its descriptive elements. Indeed, the email address, the accounts *Instagram* and *Telegram* allegedly affiliated with this page, as well as the *username* in the URL *Facebook* misspelled the candidate's surname, writing it as "Delgou"¹⁴.



The site is on the left blogdesophie.com; The site is on the right delogupourpalestine.com

On the right, the page *Facebook* "Who is Sébastien? Delogu?"



2.1.3. piquemalzero.com

The domain name piquemalzero.com¹⁵ The website, filed on February 11, 2026, targets François Piquemal, the LFI candidate for mayor of Toulouse and member of parliament for the fourth constituency of Haute-Garonne. The site is hosted by the company *Namecheap* and also uses the anonymization service *Cloudflare*. Edited under *WordPress* the site uses the same *template* "hello-elementor 3.4.6." » than the three other sites detected by VIGINUM: blogdesophie.com, lalternative2026.com and delogupourpalestine.com.



Screenshot of the page *Facebook* "I am François Piquemal And I am nothing."

VIGINUM considers this site to be linked to the page *Facebook* "I am François Piquemal and I am nothing."¹⁶, on which the *#piquemalcestma* Also created on February 9, 2026, this page disseminates a great deal of content targeting the LFI candidate. On February 24, 2026, the page notably shared a link to the website piquemalzero.com accompanied by the message, "We are not alone. A new website dares to ask the questions that few dare to ask. It seems that many share the same concerns."

¹²<https://archive.ph/O1CBf> .

¹³<https://blogdesophie.com/author/dhlkm-admin/> and <https://delogupourpalestine.com/author/kvel/>.


¹⁴<https://archive.ph/GBCCG> ; quiestdelgou@gmail.com; instagram.com/quiestdelgou, t.me/QueEstDelgou; *username Facebook*: facebook.com/QuiEstSebastienDelgou.

¹⁵<https://archive.ph/2TnzW> .

¹⁶<https://archive.ph/1rham> .

Furthermore, the #piquemalcestma was also shared on other platforms, including TikTok, by the account @funny_230¹⁷ or on Instagram, via the equivalent account of the latter, @elections_municipales_2026¹⁸.

Finally, VIGINUM also detected the presence of at least 21 accounts Facebookinauthentic, all sharing a link to the site piquemalzero.com in the comments of a post on François PIQUEMAL's official page¹⁹. These accounts all posted exactly the same link in the form "*****piquemalzero.com" between 00:01 and 00:02 on March 6, 2026.



Comments posted on the page Facebook official of François PIQUEMAL.

2.1.4. Impersonation of the association "Enfance et Partage" on Facebook

The page Facebook @EnfanceetPartageorg, created in February 2026²⁰ has usurped the identity of the French association "Enfance et Partage," founded in 1977 and specializing in child protection. While the association does have a website Facebook since 2012²¹. The page impersonating him, which has over 10,000 subscribers, is itself followed by 1,900 accounts with inauthentic characteristics.



Screenshots of the page Facebook @ChildhoodandSharingorg (on the left) impersonating the page @Childhood and Sharing (on the right) of the French association under the 1901 law "Enfance et Partage".

¹⁷<https://archive.ph/H256b>.

¹⁸This account was suspended or deleted during the day of March 5, 2026.

¹⁹[https://facebook\[.\]com/reel/2423327021466972](https://facebook[.]com/reel/2423327021466972).

²⁰<https://archive.ph/BPnwj> The page is linked to an email address. Proton: childhoodandpartageorg@proton[.]me.

²¹@ChildhoodAndSharing <https://archive.ph/SWLkX>.

Between February 15 and 22, 2026, the first posts on the fake page were identical copies of posts from the association's real account.²² However, starting on February 22, 2026, original posts were circulated denouncing a form of immunity allegedly enjoyed by high-ranking political and religious figures guilty of abusing minors. Then, from February 25 to 27, 2026, VIGINUM identified the sharing of three posts misleadingly relaying a supposed judicial investigation against François PIQUEMAL for assaulting a minor when he was a teacher at the Lycée du Mirail in Toulouse.²³ These posts received no reactions, as did other content shared on the page up to March 3, 2026, the date of the last observed activity. Furthermore, VIGINUM observed no sharing of these misleading accusations against François PIQUEMAL, nor on [the platform/platform]. *Facebook*, nor on other platforms, despite potential pre-positioning on

X²⁴.

In addition to the creation date and the narrative relayed by this page, VIGINUM also observed that *@EnfanceetPartageorghad* joined several groups *Facebook* (see [Appendix 5.3](#)) in the same timeframe as several inauthentic accounts of the ME. VIGINUM therefore links the page with a high level of confidence *@ChildhoodandSharingorgto MERokh Solis*.

2.1.5. "The hidden truth about David Guiraud"

Finally, the investigations conducted by VIGINUM also made it possible to detect the presence on *Facebook* two pages targeting the LFI candidate for mayor of Roubaix and deputy for the eighth constituency of the North, David GUIRAUD.



Screenshots of the pages *Facebook* targeting David GUIRAUD

A first page created in 2022 has been renamed *in retrospect* "The whole truth about David Guiraud," while the second page was created on February 13, 2026, and is called "Guiraud Is Zero. The facts that David Guiraud doesn't want you to know."²⁵ Following the same method used to target François PIQUEMAL, these two pages are intended for the publication of content criticizing David GUIRAUD for his pro-Palestinian positions.

Several technical characteristics allow us to link these two pages to the *MOIRokh Solis* with a high level of confidence. On the one hand, both pages feature identical profile pictures and banners. On the other hand, the origin of interactions on the various observed posts showed the involvement of the same network of inauthentic accounts as that used for the other pages. *Facebook* mentioned above (see [part 2.1.6](#)). Furthermore, one of the two pages indicates an address

²²The fake page also links to the real website, the real social media accounts and the real telephone number of the association.

²³<https://archive.ph/L5k75> ; <https://archive.ph/dNZyP> ; <https://archive.ph/Gzi0g> .

²⁴The account *X@ChildhoodP16039* (archive.ph/wip/7fiqj) created in March 2026 displays a profile picture usurping the association's logo with a *username* "Childhood & Sharing." The account displays no posts, no following, and no followers.

²⁵<https://archive.ph/kl2VJ> And <https://archive.ph/qx2bb>.


e-mail, [info@guiraudestzero\[.\]com](mailto:info@guiraudestzero[.]com), reiterating the expressions used against François PIQUEMAL. VIGINUM was unable to detect the existence of a site linked to this email address.

2.1.6. Inauthentic relays on Facebook potentially involved in other foreign digital interference operations

The analysis presented below focuses only on the three main pages identified by VIGINUM ("Sophie's Blog," "Who is Sébastien Delogu?" and "I am François Piquemal and I am nothing"). Indeed, although it was possible to detect common links on the pages targeting David GUIRAUD, the publication of an article on March 9, 2026 by the newspaper *The World*²⁶ revealing part of the campaign conducted using the *ME Rokh Solis*. This led to the rapid removal of most of the avatars at the heart of this ME. Furthermore, several technical elements were identified from inauthentic accounts on Facebook seem to indicate the presence of equivalent accounts, now deleted or suspended, on other platforms such as *Instagram*, *X* or *TikTok*, they too probably intended to amplify the digital assets of the *ME Rokh Solis*.

Thus, around the three pages Facebook in conjunction with the first three sites mentioned, VIGINUM identified the artificial mobilization of numerous accounts, whose role is limited to producing comments under the posts published on the pages Facebook of the system. For example, on the page "Who is Sébastien Delogu?", the video published on February 16, 2026, contained 18 comments that were still visible at the time of the investigation. Nine of them were posted on February 21, 2026, at exactly 12:40 PM by accounts with similar characteristics (notably male profiles created or modified in February 2026, mostly located in the United States).

These comments appear on the pages "Sophie's Blog" and "I am François Piquemal and I am nothing." Of the 338 total comments, 138 unique users were identified. Among them, three accounts commented on all three pages Facebook²⁷, while 48 of them commented on at least two of the three pages of the platform. The timing of the comments on these three different pages indicates strong coordinated mobilization of these accounts during February 2026. For example, while these pages had no visibility, more than a hundred comments were posted in a very short period of time on the page "Who is Sébastien Delogu?" around February 21, 2026.



²⁶https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/03/09/sebastien-delogu-francois-piquemal-et-lfi-cibles-par-une-campagne-dedesinformation-en-pleine-campagne-des-municipales_6670119_823448.html.


²⁷"Valéry Trottier" (<https://archive.ph/4Rfs9>), "Gervais Barnier" (<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61576708183408>), "Remy Picard" (<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61570856034692>).

Within this *cluster* of 138 accounts, five of them²⁸ They also reshared posts from the pages "I am François Piquemal and I am nothing" and "Who is Sébastien Delogu?". These relay accounts have the same characteristics as those described above:

- created on February 11 and 12, 2026;
- embodiment of a male individual, like "Kendrick Castro" and "Hanley Dolton";
- location in an American city, such as Chicago.

Still on *Facebook* VIGINUM was also able to identify another group of inauthentic accounts *a priori* intended for sharing content targeting the various LFI candidates to groups *Facebook*. In total, *at a minimum* 39 accounts participated in this distribution scheme, of which at least 20 have been suspended or deleted (see appendix).^{5.3} The accounts that are still active share common inauthentic characteristics:

- AI-generated profile pictures;
- designation by very common French names (for example: Claire Martin, Elise Martin, Etienne Martin, Sophie Dupont, Luc Dupont, *etc.*);
- threads of identical posts or republications for some accounts (for example, "Lea Leclerc" and "Camila Savard" republished the same content: videos dating from December 2025 from the "ELNET France" page)²⁹ and publications issued by the "CNEF" pages³⁰ or even "Christ Apostolic Church France");
- existence of equivalent accounts on *Instagram* and/or on *X*.



Inauthentic accounts amplifying ME content Rokh Solison *Facebook*.

²⁸<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61587747128345> (Hanley Dolton) <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61587584237367> (Kendrick Castro) <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61587664271544> (Simon Atkinson) <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61587768221403> (Staphan Nicholls) <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61588190360349> (Dom Tomlinson).

²⁹<https://archive.ph/BvZcd>.

³⁰Page *Facebook* official of the "National Council of Evangelicals of France".


Most of the groups within which these inauthentic accounts have positioned themselves target French-speaking audiences with content related to French politics, whether local or national, and often adopt a confrontational or satirical editorial line. For example:

- 23 of the 39 inauthentic accounts joined the "Right-Wing Activist" group on September 7, 2025³¹;
- 20 of the 39 inauthentic accounts joined the group "@Combat Républicain 2027" on September 7, 2025³²;
- 20 of the 39 inauthentic accounts joined the "Le Canard Enchaîné Libre" group on September 7, 2025³³;
- 18 of the 39 inauthentic accounts joined the "citizen information for tomorrow" group on September 7, 2025³⁴.

As mentioned above, most of the groups targeted by these inauthentic accounts were joined in the fall of 2025. However, a few groups were joined by these same accounts in January and February 2026 (see appendix),^{5.1} For example, on February 23, 2026, these accounts joined the groups "Arabs in Toulouse DZ" and "Muslims of Marseille," seemingly indicating that the MOI operators *Rokh Solissou* sought local audiences during the deployment of the information campaign against François PIQUEMAL and Sébastien DELOGU.

Several elements also suggest that some of these accounts may have been used in past campaigns, while others have already changed their names to possibly be used for future information operations.

For example, the account "Maxime Meireles", which joined six different groups on September 7, 2025, is now called "Romi Shushan".³⁵ and indicates a location in Tel Aviv-Jaffa. This is also the case for the account "Shirel Matana"³⁶ formerly "Amélie Charpentier", which was renamed in March 2026, and is located in Rishon Letsion, Israel.



On the left, the account formerly named "Maxime Meireles"; to the right, the account formerly known as "Amélie Charpentier"

Within this cluster, VIGINUM also detected the existence of another account, formerly named "Manon Berger".³⁷ and having joined five of the identified groups between September 7 and 8, 2025³⁸ He introduces himself today under the name "Forsane Alizza" (see part 2.2.3).

³¹<https://www.facebook.com/groups/1499298420144744/permalink/31282752168039309/> -<https://archive.ph/F6omb> .

³²<https://www.facebook.com/groups/253970028392550/permalink/2363956307393901/> -<https://archive.ph/kWMB0>.

³³<https://www.facebook.com/groups/canardlibre/permalink/31432631416352831/> -<https://archive.ph/1K5sA>.

³⁴<https://www.facebook.com/groups/179555479599180/posts/1803635097191202/> -<https://archive.ph/pL4bD>.

³⁵<https://archive.ph/q059Z>.

³⁶<https://archive.ph/5BYtg>.

³⁷<https://www.facebook.com/forsanealizza/> .

³⁸See the groups "info citoyenne pour demain", "Le Canard Enchaîné Libre", "@Combat Républicain 2027", "GAUCHE NON PUUTINISTE NON PRO HAMAS" and "Militants de Droit".


Furthermore, among the 39 inauthentic accounts described here, some appear to have been used for older information campaigns targeting the United States, particularly the New York City mayoral elections in November 2025. Indeed, VIGINUM has identified the integration of several accounts into English-speaking groups:

- Four accounts joined the "#WalkAway Campaign" group in October 2025³⁹;
- Four accounts joined the "This is Woodhaven, NYC" group in October 2025⁴⁰;
- Six accounts joined the "Brockton Political Central" group in October 2025⁴¹.

Probably as part of this dynamic, the accounts "Julie Simon" and "Théo Blanc" shared⁴² On October 6 and 7, 2025, publications from the page *Facebook* by Andrew Cuomo, Democratic candidate in the New York mayoral election.

Furthermore, VIGINUM's investigations have identified, in connection with the aforementioned accounts, another cluster of accounts with identical characteristics but this time targeting audiences in Angola. Indeed, 48 accounts still active to date have been identified and share several similarities with the cluster described previously (see appendix).^{5.3} :

- photos generated by artificial intelligence;
- use of Portuguese-sounding names ("Maria Sousa", "Paulo Carvalho", "Luisa Perreira" etc.) ;
- joint republications between these different accounts and coordination of their interactions with the same publications *via* of the *likes* or comments.



Examples of accounts from the cluster targeting Angola on Facebook.

The behavior of these accounts is based on the coordinated amplification of content produced by the Angolan government.⁴³ or content promoting the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de*

³⁹<https://www.facebook.com/groups/realwalkaway/permalink/4239894526245376/> - <https://archive.ph/ZVi7d> the campaign #WalkAway appears to have been initiated and supported online from 2018 by members of the MAGA sphere in the United States to encourage American citizens to renounce the Democratic Party.

⁴⁰<https://www.facebook.com/groups/thisisWoodhavenNYC/posts/1634959334142897/> - <https://archive.ph/jzhvO> It includes the accounts of "Luc Dupont", "Elise Martin", "Julien Garcia" and "Amélie Charpentier".


⁴¹<https://www.facebook.com/groups/1995939550643638/posts/4245488089022095/> - <https://archive.ph/6bbhn> ; see the accounts "Thomas Durand"; "Luc Dupont", "Claire Bernard", "Julien Garcia", "Amélie Charpentier" and "Elise Martin".

⁴²<https://archive.ph/Y3ZAb> ; <https://archive.ph/Xk9tV> ; <https://archive.ph/z83vE>.

⁴³<https://archive.ph/dGVzL>.

Angola⁴⁴People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Indeed, just like their counterparts in the *cluster* targeting the municipal elections in France, these accounts also coordinated to position themselves within several groups *Facebook* targeting different audiences in Angola, including groups in favor of the MPLA (see appendix 5.3 Finally, VIGINUM identified several elements indicating a certain degree of overlap between French-speaking accounts involved in operations targeting the municipal elections and Portuguese-speaking accounts targeting an Angolan audience:

- On four occasions, interactions were observed between this group of accounts labeled "Angolan" and the group targeting France. Specifically, "Diogo Pereira," "Miguel Correia," "Luzia Andrade," and "Paulo Nunes" benefited from *likes* on some of their posts from the accounts "Romi Shushan" and "Shirel Matana". Other reactions to this post also suggest the existence of another group of accounts representing individuals of Ukrainian origin.⁴⁵
- The account "Kodjo Mensah" was previously named "Ana Dos Santos", and could therefore possibly be the equivalent of the account *X @its_anasantos* (see part 3.1 and annex 5.4) ;
- the account "Carlos Fernandes" was previously named "Alex Dupuis";
- Several comments posted by these accounts under official communications from the Angolan government were posted in French and not in Portuguese (indicating a potential translation error).⁴⁶



Reactions from "Romi Shushan" and "Shirel Matana" to the republications of the cluster targeting Angola on

⁴⁴The MPLA was founded in 1956 and participated in Angola's war of independence between 1961 and 1975. Today, João Lourenço, president of the Republic of Angola, is also the leader of the MPLA.

⁴⁵Like "Teitiana Moroz", "Serhiy Koval", "Oksana Ivanova" and Lilia Bondarenko (ID: 61579822949833). See archives: <https://archive.ph/Xumnj> , <https://archive.ph/colBn> And <https://archive.ph/S0Zqb> .

⁴⁶<https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1195085675982954>; <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1193461262812062>; <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1192109809613874>.

Thus, VIGINUM was able to establish a link between accounts active during operations targeting the municipal elections and accounts involved in amplifying Angolan government publications. However, technical elements established by the Service (part^{3.3.}) seem to confirm the hypothesis that a single operator could be at the origin of both informational operations.

2.2. Staging the opposition between a supposed radical Islamist ecosystem and a so-called sovereignist association

As part of its investigation into the information campaign targeting LFI candidates, VIGINUM also detected the simultaneous deployment of digital assets designed to create a divide based on narratives that exploit the Muslim community in France. The various avatars and websites deployed during this campaign aim to simulate a split between a supposed Islamist separatist segment and a pseudo-identitarian and conservative movement.

2.2.1. lalternative2026.com

The domain name lalternative2026.com, was recorded on February 9, 2026, its real IP address has been anonymized with *Cloudflare*, and is hosted at *Namecheap*.

The site presents itself as the showcase for "The Alternative 2026", a purported "citizen initiative launched ahead of the municipal elections of March 2026", whose objective would be "to help Muslim citizens identify, in each city, the candidate who will best represent their interests".⁴⁷



Screenshot of the website lalternative2026.com

As such, the site maps 108 left-wing candidates, mainly members of *France Unbowed* whose list is supported by the party. The site presents these candidates as being able to facilitate the integration of "Muslim life" in France if they were to be elected. The site's illustrations and logo were generated using generative artificial intelligence software. *Gemini*⁴⁸, just like some of the illustrations on the site blogdesophie.com.

In February 2026, as part of an online search engine optimization strategy lalternative2026.com, the operators of the *MOIRokh Solis* used and paid for an online content placement service, *ABNewswire.com* to place an article promoting the site on various legitimate sites such as that of the agency *Associated Press* (apnews.com) or the public relations website *OpenPR*⁴⁹. VIGINUM observed only five shares of the site lalternative2026.com on social media, particularly through an account *TikTok* named [@renaissancecatholiquefr](https://www.tiktok.com/@renaissancecatholiquefr) February 24, 2026⁵⁰, and by a page *Facebook* named "Forsane Alizza" on March 2, 2026⁵¹.

⁴⁷<https://web.archive.org/web/20260228175025/https://lalternative2026.com/> .

⁴⁸Indication present in the image file name: [https://lalternative2026\[.\]com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cropped-Gemini_Generated_Image_kmrhexkrmrhexkrmrh-192x192.png](https://lalternative2026[.]com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/cropped-Gemini_Generated_Image_kmrhexkrmrhexkrmrh-192x192.png).

⁴⁹<https://ghostarchive.org/archive/MVSwF> And <https://archive.ph/VM9cz> .

⁵⁰<https://archive.ph/sxM2F> .

⁵¹<https://archive.ph/HOqbR>.

2.2.2. rcn-france.org, a fifth site raising awareness about the existence of alternative2026.com

The account *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr* was created on September 12, 2024⁵² and is used primarily to distribute videos with anti-Muslim narratives. The website is listed in the account description. *rcn-france.com*, registered on March 26, 2025. This domain name redirects to the website *rcn-france.org*, which has different technical characteristics from those of the four aforementioned sites.

Created on March 25, 2025 and using the anonymization service *Cloudflare*, *rcn-france.org* presents itself as the showcase of a French political movement with a conservative and sovereignist line, called "National Catholic Renaissance"⁵³ This movement, which has no prior existence, seems to be inspired by the name "Catholic Renaissance," a genuine conservative Catholic movement founded in 1988 that aims to "spread Christian values."⁵⁴

The site *rcn-france.org* redirects to a form *Jotform* associated with a French phone number⁵⁵ (about which VIGINUM found no information), to an account *Instagram* currently suspended, *@renaissance.catholique*, and to the account *TikTok* aforementioned.


Investigations conducted by VIGINUM have identified the organization of two actions in the physical sphere in Paris. A video, released on February 9, 2026 on the account *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr* The video shows an individual waving a flag bearing the organization's logo in front of the Sorbonne, at the Place du Panthéon. In the same video, another individual holding a leaflet with the logo of "National Catholic Renaissance" was located at 141 rue de Javel.⁵⁶ This leaflet contains, in the same way as those published by *leblogedesophie.com* a QR code which in turn links to the account *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr*.

Finally, on February 24, 2026, *@renaissancecatholiquefr* broadcast on *TikTok* A video warning against a "new website" that "claims to help voters navigate the 2026 French municipal elections," with a visual of the site *lalternative2026.com*, constituting an indirect link with the ecosystem of the first four MOI sites⁵⁷.



Screenshot of the website rcn-france.org.

Opposite, a publication of *@renaissancecatholiquefr* on *TikTok* showing a leaflet in Paris



⁵²Between September 2024 and August 2025, the account *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr* mobilized to promote the *hashtag* *pro-Israeli #TheWestIsNext* and Islamophobic narratives targeting an English-speaking audience. He later renamed himself and redirected his efforts towards sovereignist narratives targeting a French-speaking audience.

⁵³<https://web.archive.org/web/20250329084635/https://rcn-france.org/pour-la-foi-la-patrie-et-la-tradition> .

⁵⁴[https://renaissancecatholique\[.\]fr](https://renaissancecatholique[.]fr).

⁵⁵<https://archive.ph/vxiq7> .


⁵⁶<https://archive.ph/reaqI> .

⁵⁷<https://archive.ph/sxM2F> .

2.2.3. forsane-alizza.eu, a sixth site linked to the ecosystemalternative2026.com


The site *alternative2026.com* was also relayed by the group Facebook "Forsane Alizza" ⁵⁸ March 2, 2026. This page, probably bought by one of the MOI operators *Rokh Solis*, was created on December 22, 2022 and changed its name on March 2, 2026.

VIGINUM's investigations uncovered two other pages also named "Forsane Alizza", which contain the same description ("The game is not over. We are here to change France.").



Page publication Facebook "Forsane Alizza" sharing the site *alternative2026.com*

- the "Forsane Alizza" community (*facebook.com/ForsaneAlizza12*), created on March 17, 2017 but whose name changed on October 27, 2025;
- an account named "Forsane Alizza" ⁵⁹, at least active since 2025. This one was previously named "Manon Berger" (see part 1.1), and is always associated with an account *X @manon_bergers*. The latter was part of a group of accounts participating in the sharing of the account's posts *@agiresemblefronX* (see part 3.1).



Top left, result Google showing the old "Forsane Alizza" page; bottom left, screenshot of the site *forsane-alizza.eu*; On the right, one of the "Forsane Alizza" pages linked to the account *X @manon_bergers*.

The investigations carried out on this group of pages Facebook enabled VIGINUM to identify traces of an old "Forsane Alizza" page in Google search results. This page is now suspended or deactivated by the MOI operators. *Rokh Solis*, participated in the relay of the domain name *forsane-alizza.eu* This domain name was registered on September 14, 2025, on an IP address located in Sweden (80.78.18.[115]) and contains only one image, as already shown by a


⁵⁸ [facebook.com/forsanealizza0;ID102718642704535](https://www.facebook.com/forsanealizza0;ID102718642704535). See. archive : <https://archive.ph/xK0Yo> .

⁵⁹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20260307132620/https://www.facebook.com/login/?next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fforsanealizza> .


The first archive dates from October 2, 2025. According to another archive of the site, taken on October 21, 2025, there are links to "Forsane Alizza" accounts on *Instagram* and *Facebook*. The following have been added: [instagram.com/forsanealizza](https://www.instagram.com/forsanealizza) and [facebook.com/forsanealizzafr60](https://www.facebook.com/forsanealizzafr60).

On October 13, 2025, using a process identical to the coordinated dissemination of the domain name *piquemalzero.com* on the account *Facebook* François PIQUEMAL's official website, links to the site *forsanealizza.eu* were posted in the comments section of a post on the account *Facebook* official statement from Julien ODOUL, Member of Parliament *National Rally* for the 3rdth constituency of Yonne and regional councillor of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté⁶¹.

Between 1:04 PM and 1:18 PM, VIGINUM identified 39 inauthentic users who each posted a comment on the post. These users all appear to be using profiles purportedly of Vietnamese origin, and the behavior of eight of them suggests that their actions are automated. *Facebook* Indeed, these eight accounts republished the same content on their own profiles on October 13, 2025. This publication could correspond to a test phase for automating interactions with content posted from another page.⁶² "AAA Number 2", which seems *a priori* solely intended for this purpose (see below).



On the left, a screenshot of the page *Facebook* serving as support for automation tests; on the right, examples of inauthentic accounts involved in these tests and also distributing *forsane-alizza.eu* in a comment on *Facebook*



Screenshot of the message received by some representatives of *National Rally* on *WhatsApp* (source :Atlantico)

⁶⁰<https://web.archive.org/web/20251021082418/https://forsane-alizza.eu/>.

⁶¹<https://archive.ph/aQxey>.

⁶²<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61558999180069> - <https://archive.ph/4oDUg> Created on May 3, 2024. From September 24 to October 30, 2024, posts on this page take the form of tests, including the name of an action and a date (for example, "react 1 30-10"). After a year of inactivity, this page resumes the same behavior between October 12 and 30, 2025.

This escalation tactic appears to come a few days after an initial action targeting several "collaborators and elected officials of the group" *National Rally* to the Assembly [who] had the unpleasant surprise of receiving messages on their personal phone numbers, via messaging *WhatsApp* disturbing messages signed "Forsane Alizza" were found, as revealed in an article published by the media outlet. *Atlantico* October 8, 2025⁶³.

The text that makes up the message, broadcast using a British number on *WhatsApp* presents a narrative similar to that visible on the website *forsane-alizza.eu* This announcement claims the group is returning to its radical Islamist roots "to fight and defend the rights of Muslim communities," while accusing representatives of *National Rally* to "silence Muslim voices in France and Europe".

⁶³<https://atlantico.fr/article/decryptage/menaces-islamistes-sur-les-deputes-une-operation-russe-rassemblement-nationalforsane-alizza-gabriel-robin>.

3. INVOLVEMENT OF A FOREIGN ACTOR

The investigations carried out by VIGINUM concerning the digital assets constituting the MEIRokh Solishave led to the identification of several technical elements that suggest the involvement of a foreign actor. The various indicators of foreignness identified are found both in the digital infrastructure of the system and in the social media platforms (distribution patterns and attempts to amplify the content posted online).

3.1. Inauthentic links shared with a pro-Israeli organization

The account *X @Sophie'sBlog0* exhibits several inauthentic characteristics: 403 of its 416 subscribers were created on March 4, 2026, and among them, 401 accounts have no subscribers. During an initial analysis on March 5, 2026, the account *X @Sophie'sBlog0* had 416 subscribers. However, probably after a wave of account suspensions, on March 8, 2026, this same account only had 13 subscribers.

Nine of the remaining subscribers⁶⁴ belong to a network of inauthentic accounts on *X* whose activity is exclusively oriented towards relaying French-language publications of the pro-Israeli organization *ELNET* and the account *X @agiresemblefr*⁶⁵. These accounts with inauthentic characteristics (AI-generated images, inconsistent language between first and last posts) have, for the most part, changed their *username* in August 2025 (like the account *TikTok @renaissancecatholiquefr*) and show links to one of the groups of inauthentic accounts identified on *Facebook* (see part 2.1.6).

The analysis of this inauthentic activity allowed VIGINUM to identify the existence of 17 accounts belonging to the same individual. *cluster* (see appendix 5.4). They also posted replies under a post *X* of the media *South Radio* dealing with the subject of *l'alternative2026.com*⁶⁶. Two of them shared a URL from *l'alternative2026.com* in the comments, and the last one shared a screenshot of a post *Facebook* from "Forsane Alizza"⁶⁷. This screenshot also shows that the account *@its_anasantos* uses an English version of *Facebook*.

Furthermore, VIGINUM observed that the account *X* from this list *@LeaaaLeclerc*, indicates a profile similar to the one identified on *Facebook* *@lea.leclerc51*⁶⁸, notably through the use of the same profile and cover photos. While the account *X* participated in relaying content from digital assets linked to "Sophie's Blog", the account *Facebook* mobilized to promote a post from the page *Facebook* "I am François Piquemal and I am nothing." on February 19, 2026, attesting to an additional technical link between the two operations. Furthermore, the few comments present on publications of the accounts *@funny_230* and *@renaissancecatholiquefr* were published by about ten accounts that had liked the same posts from other accounts. *@agir_ensemble_*, *@justfrench*, *@drole_230* and *@renaissancecatholiquefr*. Thus, on *X*, *TikTok* and *Facebook*, publications originating from accounts of the MEIRokh Solis appear to be supported by networks of interconnected inauthentic accounts already involved in relaying publications related to *ELNET*.

⁶⁴*@ErnestEnchelom, @Adrienubois, @AlexandrMoreau, @AmeliCharpente, @LeaaaLeclerc, @manon_bergers, @Theo0Blanc, @Celinejtaime, @EscofilPericles.*

⁶⁵*Acting Together* was launched by the pro-Israel organization *ELNET* following the terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023 in Israel.

⁶⁶<https://archive.ph/3SRX0>.

⁶⁷<https://archive.ph/QbM1m> ; <https://archive.ph/UNDV7> ; <https://archive.ph/6H7VJ>.

⁶⁸<https://archive.ph/bSfAR> On this page *Facebook* Traces of his account can still be found *Instagram*, Suspended today: *@lea_6lecrec*.

3.2. Technical elements containing certain markers of foreignness

Analysis of open-source data from the various MOI sites *Rokh Solis* allowed us to identify several markers of foreignness, confirming *at a minimum* the indirect involvement of a foreign actor. Indeed, the technical analysis of the site's metadata *alternative2026.com* highlighted the presence of Hebrew characters in some .png file titles.


Autonomie-communautaire.png	Autonomie communautaire - גרפיקות לעמוד
Autorisation-du-port-de-signes-religieux.png	Autorisation du port de signes religieux - גרפיקות לעמוד
Autorisation-et-extension-de-lappel-a-la-priere.png	Autorisation et extension de l'appel à la prière - גרפיקות לעמוד
Construction-de-mosquees-et-de-minarets.png	Construction de mosquées et de minarets - גרפיקות לעמוד
Instauration-de-systemes-juridiques-religieux-distincts-notamment-lapplication-de-la-charia.png	Instauration de systèmes juridiques religieux distincts (notamment l'application de la charia) - גרפיקות לעמוד
Legalisation-de-structures-separees-par-genre-piscines-centres-sportifs-hopitaux.png	Légalisation de structures séparées par genre (piscines, centres sportifs, hôpitaux) - גרפיקות לעמוד
Reduction-du-controle-de-lEtat-dans-les-structures-educatives-distinctes.png	Réduction du contrôle de l'État dans les structures éducatives distinctes - גרפיקות לעמוד

Presence of Hebrew characters in the site's metadata *alternative2026.com*.


Furthermore, VIGINUM identified a user *Canvain* the site's metadata *forsane-alizza.eu* which is said to be located in Israel, and which has Hebrew characters in its name⁶⁹.

Furthermore, VIGINUM's investigations demonstrate that the account *TikTok@renaissancecatholiquefr*⁷⁰ includes location elements in Israel, and its name was changed on August 3, 2025⁷¹. However, between November 29, 2024 and June 18, 2025, this account broadcast several dozen English-language videos with anti-Muslim and anxiety-inducing narratives, depicting terrorist attacks on European soil.

These videos all broadcast... *hashtags* *#TheWestIsNextOr* *#TheWestIsNow*⁷² and calls for mobilization promoted by pro-Israeli circles since the terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023. If the account *@renaissancecatholiquefr* appears to have changed its name between its creation and the deployment of this campaign; the audio file linked to this account still seems to bear the mark of its former name (*@IrelandRealNews* ⁷³).



Account location *TikTok@renaissance.catholiquefr* in Israel according to the tool *mar-thing.site*



Video description *TikTok* of *@renaissancecatholiquefr* revealing the words "Ireland Real News".

⁶⁹The account *Canvain* would have been created on September 14, 2025: "username: dolipart; brand: BAGy77qLSTo; branddisplayname הצוות לטולדולipart.

⁷⁰The account has 112,500 subscribers and 430,000 "likes".

⁷¹Cross-use of tools *omar-thing.site* and *Exolyt*.


⁷²THE *hashtag* *#TheWestIsNext* is part of the narratives disseminated and promoted by pro-Israeli circles from October 2023 onwards, aimed at Western audiences, presenting Israel as the only bulwark against Hamas, whose next targets would be Europe and the West.

⁷³<https://www.tiktok.com/@renaissancecatholiquefr/video/7442494720040815915>.

Furthermore, the queries made on *Google* based on previous publications *TikTok* of *@renaissancecatholiquefr* made it possible to trace accounts that have since been deleted or suspended on *Facebook* and *Instagram*. They also appear to have participated in a campaign to disseminate the *hashtags* *#TheWestIsNextOr* *#TheWestIsNow* between the end of 2024 and June 2025, to an English-speaking audience.

For example, among the results obtained from the query "*Is London going down? Is this our future? What do you guys think? #uklondon2030 #thewestisNOW* » an account appears *Instagram*, *@trueirishvoice*⁷⁴. Although currently inaccessible, this account appears to still have an equivalent with the same name on *TikTok*⁷⁵, also located in Israel. These elements suggest that the operators of the *MOI Rokh Solis* would have targeted other hearings in the past, particularly in Ireland and England.

Moreover, the other accounts *TikTok* related to the *SELF Rokh Solis*, *@municipal_elections*⁷⁶ and *@justfrançais*. These accounts, however, are located in the United Kingdom. This location reinforces the hypothesis of the involvement of a foreign actor remobilizing accounts involved in pro-Israeli information campaigns targeting several countries, including the United Kingdom.



Account location
@trueirishvoice in Israel according to the tool
omar-thing.site

3.3. An Israeli company is probably behind the campaigns

VIGINUM has identified the existence of an Israeli company operating in the field of influence named *Blackcore*. This conclusion was confirmed by media reports. *Reuters*⁷⁷, *Release*⁷⁸ and *Haaretz*⁷⁹. Investigations into this entity have revealed a digital infrastructure linked to this pseudo-enterprise, offering services geared towards the artificial amplification of online content and the conduct of inauthentic information operations. However, this entity appears to be part of an ecosystem comprised of numerous Israeli cybersecurity companies, which at this stage prevents us from determining with sufficient confidence the identity and precise scope of the private company behind the *MOI. Rokh Solis*. Furthermore, VIGINUM has no evidence to establish the identity and origin of the clients who may have used the services of this company.

3.3.1. *Blackcore*, an Israeli entity without legal status whose strategies are similar to those observed in campaigns

The pseudo-society *Blackcore* reproduces very little open-source data, which prevents VIGINUM from verifying the legal status of this entity. *a priori*, not registered in the Israeli business registry. However, a domain name, *blackcore.onlinewas* filed on August 22

⁷⁴<https://archive.ph/A6Dun> .

⁷⁵<https://archive.ph/HTHLO> .

⁷⁶The account *TikTok @drole_230* changed their username on March 9, 2026 to become *@municipal_elections*.

⁷⁷<https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/france-probes-whether-israeli-firm-blackcore-interfered-local-elections-sources-2026-05-13/> .

⁷⁸<https://archive.ph/vZ3wc> .

⁷⁹<https://archive.ph/fk5Cr> .

2025⁸⁰, date corresponding to the activation of certain MOI digital assets *Rokh Solis*, in particular the changes in *usernames* of inauthentic accounts amplifiers on X (see part 3.1). On its website, *Blackcore* presents itself as a company delivering influence, security, and technology solutions to governments. The company also has an account *LinkedIn (@officialblackcore)*⁸¹, having only one publication dating from October 2025⁸² and counting 32 reactions from a network of inauthentic accounts (see part 3.3.3).

In addition, several subdomains are associated with the domain name *blackcore.online*:

- *angola-plan.blackcore.online*⁸³ It specifically refers to a training session given to the Angolan government in February 2026, suggesting that the Israeli company dealt directly with that government. ⁸⁴VIGINUM hypothesizes a link between the network of inauthentic accounts identified in part 2.1.6 amplifying content from the Angolan government and the activity of *Blackcore* with the same government. This hypothesis is notably supported by technical infrastructure links *we* analyzed in part 3.3.2.
- *demo.blackcore.online*⁸⁵ details the strategy employed by the company to conduct its influence operations. *Blackcore* claims in particular to have a large network of inauthentic accounts on *Facebook*, *Instagram* and *TikTok* (1,600 cumulative avatars). *Blackcore* also claims to be able to base its influence strategy on the mass sending of personal messages and the integration of communities (particularly groups) *Facebook*—a strategy already identified by VIGINUM within the framework of the maneuvers related to the MOI *Rokh Solis*, see part 2.1.6).
- *full-report.blackcore.online*⁸⁶ displays the logo of *Blackcore* containing metadata in Hebrew (נתי מסעוד) corresponding to the name Nati MASOOD. A profile *Facebook (@nati.masood.5)* belonging to Nati Eliyahu MASOOD⁸⁷ The individual, who presents himself as an Israeli citizen, could match this metadata. He appears to be a website developer.⁸⁸ and automation tools⁸⁹.

3.3.2. An infrastructure revealing a wide range of artificial amplification tools linked to operations targeting municipal elections

Among the other subdomains of *blackcore.online*, *proposals.blackcore.online* is hosted on the IP address 94.237.57.[.]56, on which three domain names have been registered: *blackcore.com*, *electricmarinade.com* and *omrisystems.com*⁹⁰ These last two allow you to retrieve a large list of subdomains (see appendix 5.5.), which seem to serve exclusively as interfaces for artificial amplification tools, for example:

⁸⁰The website was taken down following the publication of the May 2026 articles mentioned above.

⁸¹The account *LinkedIn* was also removed following the publication of the articles.

⁸²<https://archive.ph/0kOnB>.

⁸³<https://archive.ph/WQA4N>.

⁸⁴Angolan authorities have, in the past, already dealt with Israeli companies to conduct information campaigns. See the report of *Stanford Internet Observatory* of 2022 on the operations of the Israeli company *Mind Force* in Angola <https://archive.ph/aHvYx>).

⁸⁵<https://archive.ph/vRSAo>.

⁸⁶<http://web.archive.org/web/20260513153840/https://full-report.blackcore.online/>.


⁸⁷<https://archive.ph/tBP5f>.

⁸⁸<https://archive.ph/255VV>.

⁸⁹<https://archive.ph/FfmtB>.

⁹⁰These websites were also taken down following the publication of press articles.


- *fb-search.omrissystems.com* seems to provide access to an interface allowing you to find *via* An LLM (Learning Management System) uses a query to identify the most relevant associated keywords. These are then automatically used to find all the main groups. *Facebook* related to this request;
- *avatar-data-generator.electric-marinade.com* *avatar-data-generator.omrissystems.com* These are likely avatar management applications. They may have been developed by the Israeli company. *Galacticos AI* as highlighted by the title associated with the page *avatar-datagenerator.omrissystems.com*. *Login - Avatar Data*



Preview of the interface offered from *fb-search.omrissystems.com*

Generator by Galacticos AI Furthermore, another cyber entity was identified thanks to this technical element, named...*Iron Mind* (*avatar-data-generator.dev.iron-mind.ai*).

The technical elements identified around this entity made it possible to trace it back to the domain name. *iron-mind.ai*⁹¹ Likely specializing in software development, the company behind the digital services presented on *iron-mind.ai*, named *Iron Mind AB*, was registered in Sweden by Nir DOBICKY on October 30, 2025⁹². Nir DOBICKY⁹³, an individual claiming to be of Israeli origin, born in April 1980, is also the head of several companies registered in the United Kingdom and Sweden (notably *Rocketpod Technologies LTD*⁹⁴ and *Blade Marketing*, also known as *Social Worx LTD*⁹⁵). These companies specialize primarily in online influence services *via* automation tools, particularly on *LinkedIn*, platform also involved in artificial amplification activities related to *Blackcore* (see part 3.3.3).



Screenshot of the home pages of *social-worx.com* (left) and *rocket-pod.ai* (right)

Furthermore, thanks to the investigations conducted on the infrastructure *web* around *electric-marinade.com* VIGINUM detected traces of another campaign targeting a pro-Palestinian audience. Indeed, the email server (*mail server*) associated with *electric-marinade.com*, *smt.p.electric-marinade.com*,

⁹¹This domain name has not been mentioned in the press and the websites associated with it are, to date, still active.

⁹²<https://archive.ph/37avF> ; company no. 559551-9181; address: Kopparvägen 44, 187 45 Täby).

⁹³Nir DOBICKY also goes by the name Niro Knox on his social media.


⁹⁴<https://archive.ph/mGtUG> . *RocketPods* notably the company that developed *How to...*, a comment automation tool *LinkedIn* (<https://archive.ph/xGq9n> .)

⁹⁵<https://archive.ph/8dHyB> .

hosted on the IP address 5.22.213[.]198 is also linked to the domain names *sadaqahpalestine.com*⁹⁶. Now inactive, this website promoted a pseudo-charitable organization in support of the Palestinian population called "Sadaqah Palestine".⁹⁷ Several accounts are associated with this domain name on X, Facebook and Instagram⁹⁸ (only the account X is still active to this day).

Account activity analysis X @sadaqahpalestin revealed the existence of a group of accounts participating in amplifying its posts. These posts all benefited from comments posted by accounts whose characteristics exhibit numerous markers of inauthenticity and behavior identical to the accounts identified in the posting of comments on content within the pages Facebook targeting Sébastien DELOGU, François PIQUEMAL and David GUIRAUD:

- artificial production of comments generated via an LLM;
- use of several languages in their overall business (English, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Arabic);
- account creation dates and publication frequency indicating automation of these actions by the operator of this group;
- Female or male profiles, young, with English-sounding names and some featuring profile pictures generated by artificial intelligence.



Example of a publication of @sadaqahpalestin on X having benefited of an inauthentic activity.

However, these accounts are also present in the comments of some of the account's posts. X by Nir Dobicky, @niroknos⁹⁹. Furthermore, if the main activity of these accounts involves amplifying publications dealing with specific themes *lifestyle* or quantified assets, they nevertheless appear to be mobilized on an ad hoc basis for more specific operations such as "Sadaqah

⁹⁶Only three domain names are associated with this mail server, including *electric-marinade.com* and *sadaqahpalestine.com*.

⁹⁷This expression could refer to projects led by bodies such as *Muslims Around The World* (MATW) or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), referring to the concept of charity, *sadaqah* in Arabic ((صدقة)).


⁹⁸@SadaqahPalestin on X (<https://archive.ph/WClbq>) ; @sadaqahpalestine on Instagram; Sadaqah Palestine » on Facebook ([facebook.com/sadaqahpalestine](https://www.facebook.com/sadaqahpalestine)); <https://web.archive.org/web/20260521132548/>; <https://www.google.com/web/20260521132548/>; <https://www.google.com/search?q=%22sadaqah+palestine%22+facebook&sxsr=ANbLn7raeB1PiAzKLG5URstT7H2PAdUEq%3A1779369192632&sei=3AcPaoXLEJ3CkPIPzi-fqQU> .

⁹⁹<https://ghostarchive.org/archive/rqvtX> ; <https://ghostarchive.org/archive/RRR0l> ; <https://ghostarchive.org/archive/3ttx7> .

"Palestine" or, more recently, regarding the latest elections in Scotland. Indeed, the account of the Scottish First Minister, John Swinney, as well as that of his party, the *Scottish National Party* (SNP), appear to have been targeted four times between January 6 and May 8, 2026, by the coordinated posting of English-language comments from these inauthentic accounts.

As part of this operation, VIGINUM identified the mobilization of at least 256 accounts that enabled the dissemination of 1,400 comments, primarily on the publications of *@JohnSwinney*, *@theSNP* and *@ScotGovFM* (652, 338 and 112 comments respectively).

Furthermore, the use of the logo present on the account *X @sadaqahpalestin* made it possible to identify, via a review of the platform *Fiverr*. The profile "paullussac" is believed to be the one that initiated the request for services to create this logo.¹⁰⁰




Review left by "paullussac" on Fiverr

Investigations into this profile revealed the presence of other reviews left by the same person, notably for the generation of videos using artificial intelligence that would be intended for Togolese or Gabonese audiences.¹⁰¹ One of the reviews left by "paullussac" also refers to the creation of a website for a company located in Israel: *twostepinnovations.com*¹⁰². However, this domain name is hosted on the same IP addresses that were previously located *blackcore.online*¹⁰³.

Finally, VIGINUM noted the presence of a telephone number on the site *sadaqahpalestine.com*. THE Investigations carried out around this number have led to the identification of an account *TikTok*, *@deepdiveafrica*, created on April 10, 2025 and indicating a location in Israel.¹⁰⁴ While a post from *@deepdiveafrica* promotes the opening of an Israeli hospital in Togo for humanitarian purposes¹⁰⁵. Another of his publications displays a logo with the inscription "Politizando Angola"¹⁰⁶.

Through this method, VIGINUM identified an account *Instagram* still active *@politizando_angola*, created in January 2026¹⁰⁷, as well as a page *Facebook* inactive « Politizand



On the left, using the tool marthing.site; On the right, the "Politizando Angola" logo in a video of the account TikTok @deepdiveafrica

¹⁰⁰<https://www.fiverr.com/ayeshamalik100/design-modern-and-professional-business-logo-and-branding> .

¹⁰¹https://www.fiverr.com/firna_moh/create-ai-story-animations-and-lip-sync-video-using-ai ; <https://br.fiverr.com/zinzir/spraypaint-your-look-or-image-or-nft-on-a-graffiti-wall-4k-animated-video> .

¹⁰²<https://www.fiverr.com/eyaakubhossain> .

¹⁰³185.230.63[.1107 ; 185.230.63[.1171 ; 185.230.63[.1186 and 34.149.87[.145.

¹⁰⁴<https://archive.ph/ON9zf> .

¹⁰⁵<https://archive.ph/BVlx8> .

¹⁰⁶<https://archive.ph/sYBjS> .

¹⁰⁷<https://archive.ph/Es26c> .

Angola »¹⁰⁸The searches conducted on this page *Facebook* showed that it had integrated into the same groups as those identified for the accounts *Facebook* authentic targeting Angola (see part 2.1.6 Finally, another account *TikTok*, *@africa_real_news*¹⁰⁹ presents a publication feed almost identical to that of *@deepdiveafrica* and also indicates a location in Israel. The identification of technical links between these operations and the infrastructure *web of Blackcore*, allows, in particular through the detected amplification processes, for these elements to be linked to the MOI *Rokh Solis* and to foreign digital interference operations analyzed in the context of municipal elections in France.

Furthermore, investigations conducted on the IP address 94.237.57.[.]56 revealed several open ports on the server, including port 3002, which is associated with an API. The configuration of this server allows for linking domain names. *electric-marinade.com*, *omrisystems.com* and possibly *sni.ai*, as suggested by the subdomains *sni-staging*¹¹⁰ At this stage, the entities named *Blackcore*, *Electric Marinade* and *Omri systems* do not appear to have any legal existence, unlike *Galacticos AI*, *SNI* and *Iron-Mind*.

Among the rare mentions that are made online of *Galacticos AMIGINUM* identified a publication from the website of a law firm specializing in international affairs: *Afik & Co*¹¹¹. The latter is located at 103 Hachashmonaim in Tel Aviv, and was founded by Doron AFIK¹¹² The article in question, published on September 21, 2025¹¹³ on *afiklaw.com*, returns to the organization of a "diplomatic cocktail" at their premises. Photos of this event, published in the article and on *Facebook*¹¹⁴, attest to the presence of an individual named Yigal UNNA¹¹⁵, a priori invited as a representative of the company *Galacticos AI* (see part 3.3.3).

However, a company named *Galacticos LTD*¹¹⁶ is domiciled at the same address as the firm *Afik & Co* According to the website *checkid.co.il* Doron Afik would be part of the management of *Galacticos LTD*¹¹⁷. The company also has a domain name *galacticos.ai*, inaccessible to date, and recorded on April 17, 2024 by Guy GEYOR via the company *SNI*, also residing at 103 Hachashmonaim in Tel Aviv. Guy GEYOR appears to know Doron AFIK, since the investigations conducted on his account *LinkedIn*¹¹⁸

They show him photographed with the latter at least twice during the year 2025. Nir Dobicky also appears to be linked to the company *Afik & Co.*, since he has been identified several times in posts from the account *Instagram* of the company¹¹⁹ Furthermore, Doron AFIK, Guy GEYOR and Nir DOBICKY follow each other on *Instagram*.

Finally, at least two publications¹²⁰ on *LinkedIn*, respectively linked to the law firm *Afik & Co.* and *Blackcore* appear to have benefited from artificial amplification by the same group of around thirty accounts a priori inauthentic (see appendix 5.6.).

¹⁰⁸<https://facebook.com/61586801304537> .

¹⁰⁹<https://archive.ph/41Lpg> .

¹¹⁰Database configuration: DB_HOST: pg.electric-marinade.com; DB_NAME: sni-staging; DB_PORT: 5432; SERVER_NAME: backend.electric-marinade.com; CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: [https://edge\[.\]omrisystems\[.\]com](https://edge[.]omrisystems[.]com).

¹¹¹<https://archive.ph/rFYQU>.

¹¹²<https://archive.ph/pLRUC>.

¹¹³<https://archive.ph/F7lhK>.

¹¹⁴<https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10239149286493679> ; <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10239149286253673>

¹¹⁵Yigal UNNA is the first and former director general of the *Israel National Cybersecurity Directorate* (INCD), the government entity responsible for structuring Israeli cybersecurity policy and cyber defense capabilities. INCD was created in 2017 through the consolidation of expertise from several pre-existing Israeli agencies.

¹¹⁶Company registration number of Galacticos LTD: 516599818.

¹¹⁷checkid.co.il/company/GALACTICOS++LTD-OJX4GOe-516599818.

¹¹⁸<https://archive.ph/39hOK> ; <https://archive.ph/rqkBs> .

¹¹⁹<https://archive.ph/7wBsK> .

¹²⁰<https://archive.ph/Rs6pH> And <https://archive.ph/0kOnB> .

3.3.3. Links with a business angel Israeli

Research conducted on these different entities reveals that *Blackcore* is part of a vast ecosystem of Israeli cybersecurity companies and entities. Yigal Unna thus emerges as a central figure in this ecosystem, firstly as the former CEO of the *Israel National Cyber Directorate* (INCD) and on the other hand due to his various past experiences within Unit 8200 of *IDF* and of the *Shin Bet*¹²¹.

Yigal UNNA is now at the head of an incubator for Israeli cybersecurity companies, *Cygun LTD*, which he founded on October 10, 2022¹²². The site *cygun.co.il*¹²³ presents both Yigal UNNA's background and the company's objectives, whose activities are essentially based on providing cybersecurity support to government and private entities.



Photo by Yigal UNNA on cygun.co.il



Company logo Galacticos LTD on cygun.co.il.

So, *Cygun* develops consulting activities and various projects via the establishment of a network, particularly with partners such as the Israeli investment fund *Iron Nation*. *Cygun* also participates in supporting numerous *startups* Israeli, including *Galacticos AI*¹²⁴. Most of *startups* displayed alongside *Galacticos AI* Yigal UNNA are included in their leadership bodies.

¹²¹Unit 8200 is a branch of the Israeli army's intelligence services (*IDF*), particularly specializing in signals intelligence (SIGINT). The *Shin Bet* is the Israeli domestic intelligence service.

¹²²Company number: 516559317; <https://archive.ph/poaUz>.

¹²³<https://archive.ph/a3TpX>; <https://archive.ph/lXsN8>.

¹²⁴<https://archive.ph/6Mw2E> list of startups supported by *Cygun LTD* on the company's website.

4. IMPLICATION OF THE NATION'S FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS

In light of his malicious activity, **the ME Rokh Solis was deliberately used to try to alter citizens' information** in the context of the municipal election, and is therefore likely to harm the fundamental interests of the Nation.


Indeed, on the one hand, digital assets *blogdesophie.com*, *delogupourpalestine.com* And *piquemalzero.com* aimed to denigrate the LFI party and three of its candidates, both on the basis of the instrumentalization of programmatic elements, as well as accusations of crimes or offenses.

On the other hand, digital assets, including *@renaissancecatholique* from *TikTok*, *rcn-france.org*, *lalternative2026.com* and the group *Facebook* "Forsane Alizza" have sought to polarize the digital public debate by instrumentalizing the Muslim community. **However, the various digital assets of the ME Rokh Solis once deployed, they had very low online visibility, despite numerous attempts at artificial amplification.**


In light of the aforementioned factors and the complexity, longevity, and scope of this system, **VIGINUM considers that the activities of Rokh Solis meet the criteria for foreign digital interference** The Service will continue its investigations to further characterize the nature of the operators behind the MOI *Rokh Solis*.

5. ANNEXES

5.1. Chronology of MOI Campaign Deployment *Rokh Solis*



5.2. Infrastructure Diagram web of MERokh Solis



5.3. Lists of inauthentic accounts on *Meta* and targeted groups

- List of inauthentic accounts on *Facebook* having targeted the 2026 municipal elections:

Name	ID	Active	Other accounts	Archive
Théo Blanc	100009837391284	Yes	<i>instagram.com/theoblanc</i> <i>x.com/Theo0Blanc</i>	https://archive.ph/DjYUV
Julie Simon	100008980603303	Yes	<i>instagram.com/julie_12simon</i>	https://archive.ph/p1X5u
Elise Martin		No		
Adrien Dubois		No	<i>x.com/Adrienubois</i>	
Camille Bouvet	100000966362066	Yes	<i>instagram.com/camibouvet</i>	https://archive.ph/UJMcP
Romi Shushan / Maxime Meireles	100002001680594	Yes	<i>instagram.com/romishushan446</i>	http://archive.ph/q059Z
Shirel Matana / Amélie Carpenter	1197189204	Yes	<i>x.com/AmeliCharpente</i>	https://archive.ph/5BYtq
Alexandre Moreau		No	<i>x.com/AlexandrMoreau</i>	
Camila Savard / Todd Shaw	100084410421939	Yes	<i>instagram.com/fitness.camila</i>	https://archive.ph/2dnnW
Dimitri Davin / Frederick Nikolai	100005496518952	Yes	<i>instagram.com/dimitri_davin</i>	https://archive.ph/2q9AR
Julien Garcia		No	<i>x.com/JulienGGarcia</i>	
Thomas Germain		No		
Eloïse Rousseau		No		
Manon Berger / Forsane Alizza	100068076475246	Yes	<i>x.com/manon_bergers</i>	
Céline Aimé		No	<i>x.com/Celinejtaime</i>	
Amélie Fontaine	100052425981422	Yes	<i>instagram.com/amelieeefontaine</i>	https://archive.ph/asiGO
Antoine Delaunay		No		
Claire Bernard		No	<i>x.com/ClairebBernard</i>	
Luc Dupont		No		
Giti Yee	61585985705539	Yes		https://archive.ph/Cyhvu
Etienne Martin		No		
Margaux Faure		No		
Lea Leclerc	100025205192191	Yes	<i>x.com/LeaaaLeclerc</i> <i>instagram.com/lea_6leclerc</i>	https://archive.ph/Lmd75
Thomas Durand		No		
Margarida Lopes	61585780155956	Yes		https://archive.ph/aGpLB
Renato Vieira	61585805924593	Yes		https://archive.ph/OtNsG
Adolfo Martins	61586021854055	Yes		
Fernanda Gaspar	61586216963960	Yes		https://archive.ph/xl0pB
Guiraud Est Zéro.	61586021854055	No		https://archive.ph/qx2bb
Childhood and Sharing	61587863747582	Yes		https://archive.ph/BPnwj
Hugo Roche		No		
Claire Perrin		No		
Ngan Hale 68	100075968945688	Yes		https://archive.ph/tt5rb
Briceño Arteaga Steven		No		
Claire Martin		Yes	<i>instagram.com/clair3martin</i>	https://archive.ph/iajMF
Alice Thomas	61580030243617	Yes		https://archive.ph/JJsKi
Olivia Reyes		No		
Sophie Dupont	100009534210453	Yes	<i>instagram.com/sophiesodupont</i>	https://archive.ph/bufVO
Jimena Quiles	100012527208960	Yes	<i>instagram.com/jimena.quiles1</i>	https://archive.ph/dPQsK

- List of Groups *Facebook* integrated by the accounts mentioned *above*:

Band	Date of integration	Archive
@Republican Combat 2027	September 7, 2025	https://archive.ph/kWMBO
YELLOW VEST (Official)	February 19 and 20, 2026	https://archive.ph/hTKra
Morannes-sur-Sarthe - Daumeray Group Participation Citizen	September 7, 2025	https://archive.ph/MSRHC
LEFT NON-PUTINIST NON-HAMAS	September 7 or 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/rS9F7
Open debates between working-class activists...	September 2, 2025	https://archive.ph/CRGZz
Citizen information for tomorrow	September 7, 2025	https://archive.ph/pL4bD
The Free Chained Duck	September 7, 2025	https://archive.ph/1K5sA
Right-wing activists	September 3 and 7, 2025	https://archive.ph/F6omb
We don't want France in Africa anymore.	February 19, 2026	https://archive.ph/Q6G8J
Arabs in Toulouse, Algeria	February 23, 2026	facebook.com/groups/296627961925871/user/61585985705539
The Muslims of Marseille	February 23, 2026	facebook.com/groups/1109495699125734/user/61585780155956/
#WalkAwayCampaign	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/Zvi7d
Brockton Political Central	October 2025	https://archive.ph/6bqbn
Canadian Politics on Facebook	From December 30, 2025 to January 1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/9rj05 https://archive.ph/crCxd
Bunge La Nyangores (BLN)	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/naAqP
Desi in Chicago, Illinois	September 30, 2024	https://archive.ph/5Gxnc
For rent in Hopkinsville/Christian county, KY	January 3, 2025	https://archive.ph/q9dJM
Cars For Sale Kentucky	January 3, 2025	https://archive.ph/xqH0j
Democracy Advocate Initiative	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/X5bdZ
Gnat Youth	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/YI8Pf https://archive.ph/bHGAS
Land in Paris, France	January 20, 2026	https://archive.ph/Thjzp
Jobs in Paris (and rest of France)	January 20, 2026	https://archive.ph/wte7M
Mastrick, Sheddocksley & Summerhill Community Council	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/dmQnQ
World Evangelism Missions	1 ^{er} November 2025	https://archive.ph/0VQ6X
This is Woodhaven, NYC	October 12, 2025	https://archive.ph/jzhwO
Ozone Park Residents Association	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/k29ou
Morris Park in the Bronx	October 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/FLTQJ
Grow As A Keyboardist	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/Kqe17 https://archive.ph/pWlcb
YOUTH ON A MISSION	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/DNFpy
CHRISTIANS OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF GOD OF BURKINA FASO	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/sLA9U
Gwoup priyè pou Kris	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/gfE1A
Maisons-Laffite: Then and Now	1 ^{er} January 2026	https://archive.ph/ymz9a

- List of inauthentic accounts on Facebook and Instagram involved in an information operation in Angola:

Name	ID	Other accounts	Archive
Ana Costa	100065275154182	<i>instagram.com/ana.costa71°</i>	https://archive.ph/hdH0O
Ana Fernandes	61566985475011		https://archive.ph/gdk7Z
Ana Silva	61578598422959		https://archive.ph/tWZYA
Beatriz Sousa	61583790852561		https://archive.ph/7rEBj
Carla Neves	61577987549046		https://archive.ph/yo5tj
Carlos Fernandes	61567345971248		https://archive.ph/n7qlly
Carlos Fernandes/Alex Dupuis	61553237953183		https://archive.ph/xnH41
Carlos Silva	100091783742493		https://archive.ph/IS6dB
Claudia Gomes	61579254197392		https://archive.ph/pM21w
Diogo Pereira	100091682196038		https://archive.ph/lbb6L
Elda Campos	61579335971978		https://archive.ph/NWwyc
Elisa Rocha	61579797809650		https://archive.ph/3CeZm
Elsa Moreira	61566923018785		https://archive.ph/LC8BE
Francisco Moreira	100091760943581		https://archive.ph/rzDYy
Hugo Gomes	61579414906699		https://archive.ph/TsxF1
Isabel Novais	100091830510088		https://archive.ph/DFM98
Isabel Vicente	100091784311620		https://archive.ph/kq0TH
Jorge Campos	61578789192522	<i>instagram.com/jorgecamposa17</i>	https://archive.ph/YMO0y
José Machado	61566878321334		https://archive.ph/CSo7d
José Silva	61578754215908		https://archive.ph/dnyvu
Joseph Adu/Isabel Franco	100091734470667		https://archive.ph/leI2X
Julia Martins	61579817459526		https://archive.ph/Bhj4o
Julia Silva	61578979766787		https://archive.ph/qHeeA
Kauan Borges	100026779241205	<i>instagram.com/kauanborges.h76</i>	https://archive.ph/QnORT
Kíala Manuel Fernandes	61567523203140		https://archive.ph/W8bcn
Kodjo Mensah/Ana Dos Santos	61555847610347		https://archive.ph/zZCdi
Luisa Pereira	61578843424485		https://archive.ph/stPbC
Luzia Andrade	61579389609782		Luzia Andrade Facebook
Maria Ferreira	100012961032657	<i>instagram.com/mar.ferreira43</i>	https://archive.ph/xDkAE
Maria Sousa	61553750844339		https://archive.ph/2MG7P
Mariana Costa	61579907332260		https://archive.ph/vaBII
Mariana Pereira	100091798291763		https://archive.ph/6HIEY
Marta Castro	61578975732597		https://archive.ph/LpC6Y
Marta Dias	61579720739286		https://archive.ph/pXiif
Mateus Silva	61568633517176		https://archive.ph/yeMjm
Miguel Correia	61578910990796		https://archive.ph/FJqx2
Nancy Kato	61567551098312		https://archive.ph/pLxuX
Patricia Domingos	100004287882617		https://archive.ph/nbzqI
Paulo Carvalho	61579038305054		https://archive.ph/LNnSn
Paulo Costa	61579286237069		https://archive.ph/zcp20
Paulo Nunes	61579629507371		https://archive.ph/uy9c0
Pedro Costa	61579609774855		https://archive.ph/d0lJP
Pedro Moreira	61578786035910		https://archive.ph/GNMcd
Rafael Almeida	100091825800193		https://archive.ph/rA3TN
Raquel Lourenço	61568282440959		https://archive.ph/S035N
Rita Santos	61578854823330		https://archive.ph/tGnVb
Sofia Costa	100091774052498		https://archive.ph/xfzPf
Soykat Hasan/Lucas Neto	100091777472324		https://archive.ph/XksEr


- List of Groups *Facebook* integrated by the accounts mentioned *above*:

Band	Date of integration	Archive
POLITICA PARA TODOS	May 30 and June 2, 2025	https://archive.ph/E0spE https://archive.ph/vjMe3
Angola	September 27, 2025; 10, 11, 17 and 22 November 2025, January 24, 2026	https://archive.ph/9xDYA
Angola em Movimento	December 12-13, 2025	https://archive.ph/stNrN
ANGOLA: POVOS & LINGUAS	May 20 and June 2, 2025	https://archive.ph/TsaoI https://archive.ph/xn1S3
ANGOLA. O PAIS	May 25, 2025	https://archive.ph/4jZng
ANGOLANOS UNIDOS POR UMA ANGOLA MELHOR	May 20, 2025; December 13, 2025; January 25, 2026; 1 st and February 6 2026	https://archive.ph/IRiOG https://archive.ph/WpT9H https://archive.ph/tlRDU https://archive.ph/rIutX http://archive.ph/dCD4d
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ANGOLA	May 31 and June 3, 2025	https://archive.ph/GnXvE
INFORMAR COM VERDADE	November 2, 2025	https://archive.ph/0suub
MPLA - CUBANGO	November 17, 18, 22 and 23, 2025; January 24 and 25, 2026	https://archive.ph/wHhk3 https://archive.ph/beAYt https://archive.ph/huy2D https://archive.ph/LixuL https://archive.ph/e6vWT
MPLA - FACEBOOK DO CAP DE LISBOA	November 2, 18, 23 and 24, 2025	https://archive.ph/hbPYh https://archive.ph/8xOOn
MPLA RUMA A 2027 EA VITORIA E CERTA	November 2, 17, 18, 22, 23 and 29, 2025; January 24 and 26, 2026	https://archive.ph/YQ8DM https://archive.ph/fQrTe https://archive.ph/j05V0 https://archive.ph/UdaH4
Ordem dos amigos tabilistas de Angola	May 31 and June 3, 2024	https://archive.ph/zM9mb https://archive.ph/xHPkN
OS JURISTAS E ESTUDIANTES DO CURSO DE DIREITO/INTERACCAO TOTAL	November 2, 2025	https://archive.ph/dhNYU
VIANA= MPLA,OMA,JMPLA « MELHORAR O QUE ESTA BEM, CORRECT WHERE IS WRONG »	November 26, 2025; December 13 and 14, 2025; January 25 and 26 2026; February 2 and 12, 2026	https://archive.ph/W2qFN https://archive.ph/0apHS https://archive.ph/2fJlq https://archive.ph/5nILl https://archive.ph/ISnn4
VOZ DA DIASPORA	November 20, 22 and 26, 2025; 25 January 2026	https://archive.ph/L0mp9 https://archive.ph/pu02S https://archive.ph/2ZFFB https://archive.ph/wND7J
As Mulheres Mais Lindas de Angola	September 11, 2025	https://archive.ph/oqXQL
Dr Abel Chivukuvuku Para Presidente em 2027. EU APOIO!	November 8, 2025	https://archive.ph/SeWIT
African History Group	January 5, 2026	https://archive.ph/rqdOu
Realistic transfer	August 26, 2025	https://archive.ph/aqUy2

5.4. List of account cluster X involved in the information campaign targeting the municipal elections

Account	Date of Creation	Date of modification of the name user	Sharing Act Together and/or ELNET	Suit the blog Sophie's	Comment there publication of South Radio	Location of account	Version X
<i>Etienne3Martin</i>	April 2019	August 2025	X			United Kingdom	Web
<i>JulienGGarcia</i>	October 2012	August 2025	X			Kingdom-United	Web
<i>EscofilPericles</i>	June 2014	Unknown	X	X	X	Europe	Web
<i>Adrienubois</i>	September 2015	August 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>AlexandrMoreau</i>	March 2022	August 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>manon_bergers</i>	FEBRUARY 2012	February 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>Theo0Blanc</i>	March 2014	August 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>AmeliCharpente</i>	FEBRUARY 2013	August 2025	X	X		United Kingdom	Web
<i>LeaaaLeclerc</i>	January 2015	August 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>Celinejtaine</i>	September 2012	February 2025	X	X		Europe	Web
<i>LucasgGirard</i>	January 2014	August 2025	X			Swiss	App Store
<i>Claire Bernard</i>	March 2015	August 2025	X			Europe	Web
<i>Gabholland_</i>	May 2025	May 2025			X	Europe	Web
<i>its_anasantos</i>	May 2025	May 2025			X	Europe	Web
<i>reevaw_</i>	May 2025	May 2025			X	Europe	Web
<i>ErnestEnchelom</i>	August 2025	August 2025		X		France	Web

5.5. Infrastructure diagram *Blackcore*



5.6. Account Cluster List *LinkedIn* involved in amplifying the publication of *Blackcore*

Name	Reaction to the publication of Blackcore	Reaction to the publication by Afik & CO.	Location	Number of subscribers
Laurie Tang	Yes	Yes	Singapore	3,353
Mike Thest	Yes	Yes	Cebu, Philippines	588
Mario Giacobbo	Yes	Yes	Madrid, Spain	3,275
Vanessa Valkova	Yes	Yes	New York, United States	8,621
José Luis Rivero	Yes	Yes	Madrid, Spain	10,047
Pablo Mark	Yes	Yes	Buenos Aires, Argentina	2,197
Joseph Robinson	Yes	No	New York, United States	12,706
Ellen Smith	Yes	Yes	San Francisco, United States	556
Martina A.	Yes	Yes	Padua, Italy	27,651
Ted Wijnen	Yes	Yes	Utrecht, Netherlands	2,606
Silvia Borralho	Yes	Yes	Lisbon, Portugal	5,893
Beny Dorsey	Yes	No	Scotland	
Catherine Wiesel	Yes	Yes	Torcy, France	1,168
Milena Mineo	Yes	Yes	Milan, Italy	814
Licinio Gaspar	Yes	Yes	Lisbon, Portugal	3,233
Jordan Daley	Yes	Yes	Exton, United States	1817
Miguel Duarte Pereira	Yes	Yes	Porto, Portugal	3,277
Rich Odonnel	Yes	Yes	Spring, United States	2,216
Ronald Thomas	Yes	Yes	New York, United States	516
Sander van den Berg	Yes	Yes	Amsterdam, Netherlands	8092
Maria José Bravo	Yes	Yes	Montijo, Portugal	7048
Adriana Minotto	Yes	Yes	Milan, Italy	4056
Jon Tavarez	Yes	Yes	Tampa Bay, United States	10,366
Herman Boontje	Yes	Yes	Rotterdam, Netherlands	757
Carla Valerio	Yes	Yes	Lisbon, Portugal	4,479
Konstantin Frolov	Yes	No	Lithuania	8,606
Andrea Gatti	Yes	Yes	Milan, Italy	4,376
Ruben De Beus	Yes	Yes	Ede, Netherlands	1,246
David HTL	Yes	No	Paris, France	521
Marco Valente	Yes	Yes	Montijo, Portugal	2,538

ABOUT VIGINUM



Created on July 13, 2021 and attached to the SGDSN, the service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference (VIGINUM) has as its purpose the protection of digital public debate relating to the fundamental interests of the Nation.

This technical and operational state service has the mission of detecting and characterizing information manipulation campaigns on digital platforms, involving foreign actors with the aim of harming France and its interests.

[Service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference | SGDSN](#)

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